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THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANIZATION
AND INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS

A. Introduction
That inferior labor conditions in one country can supply it with a trade
advantage over its competitors is not an idea of recent vintage. Likewise,
pleas for universal labor standards on humanitarian and economic grounds
were first made in the nineteenth century. Edward E. Potter, The International
Labor Organization, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 85-2 (3d
ed., William L. Keller & Timothy J. Darby eds., 2009) (hereinafter Potter, The
ILO). Despite some incipient efforts, however, scant progress was made toward
establishing global labor standards until 1919. In that year, in the aftermath of
World War I, the International Labour Organization (ILO) was established by
the Treaty of Versailles as an autonomous body within the ill-fated League of
Nations. BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 29-30 (2005). The ILO
survived the disintegration of League, becoming in 1946 a specialized, tripartite
agency of the United Nations, with member nations sending delegations comprised of representatives from government, organized labor, and employers. As
of May 2011, it had 183 member countries.
Animating the formation of the new organization in 1919 were the goals of
promoting fair trade and ensuring worker protection from exploitation. The
ILO was also founded on the principle that advancing social justice is a key
element to establishing lasting peace. To those ends, the ILO’s role is to promulgate and promote international standards for implementation by its member nations. Traditionally, the agency principally advanced its goals by adopting
conventions and recommendations. Lee Swepston, International Labour
Law, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED
MARKET ECONOMIES 141, 142 (10th ed., Roger Blanpain ed., 2010) (hereinafter
Swepston, International Labour Law). Conventions are binding legal instruments on the countries that ratify them, while recommendations provide
guidance. Id. at 143. More recently, however, the ILO has focused on additional
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techniques, including adopting declarations and pursuing its decent work
campaign.
Guiding the work of the agency at its inception were nine principles of
special importance set forth in Article 427 of the Treaty of Versailles. The list
included a statement that labor should not be regarded as a commodity or
article of commerce, recognition of employees’ freedom of association,
endorsement of the 8-hour workday or 48-hour workweek standard, and an
admonition that men and women should receive equal pay for work of equal
value. Potter, The ILO, at 85-4–85-5.
Despite the lofty language of Article 427, human rights concerns received
little attention by the ILO in the period between 1919 and 1939. Breen
Creighton, The Future of Labour Law: Is There a Role for International Labour
Standards?, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 253, 254 (Catherine Barnard, Simon
Deakin & Gillian S. Morris eds., 2004). With the exception of Convention
No. 29, Forced Labour (1930), the conventions adopted were generally more
technical and prescriptive in orientation. For example, among the early conventions adopted were the Hours of Work Convention, which mandated
adherence to the 8-hour workday/48-hour workweek standard, and conventions restricting night work for women and young persons. Indeed, the ILO in
its early years made no distinction between labor standards and human rights,
instead viewing all conventions as mechanisms for ensuring worker dignity and
social justice. Janice R. Bellace, Achieving Social Justice: The Nexus Between the
ILO’s Fundamental Rights and Decent Work, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 5,
11 (2011).

B. The ILO Declarations
As World War II drew to a close, human rights concerns came to the fore,
beginning with the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, which was annexed to the
ILO Constitution.

Declaration Concerning the Aims and
Purposes of the International Labour Organization
(Declaration of Philadelphia)
ILO Constitution, as amended Oct. 9, 1946, Annex, 62 Stat. 3485, 15 U.N.T.S. 35

I

The Conference reaffirms the fundamental principles on which the
Organization is based and, in particular, that —
(a) labour is not a commodity;
(b) freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained
progress;
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(c) poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere;
(d) the war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigor
within each nation, and by continuous and concerted international
effort in which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying
equal status with those of governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic decision with a view to the promotion of the
common welfare.
II

Believing that experience has fully demonstrated the truth of the statement
in the Constitution of the International Labour Organization that lasting
peace can be established only if it is based on social justice, the Conference
affirms that —
(a) all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to
pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development
in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal
opportunity;
(b) the attainment of the conditions in which this shall be possible must
constitute the central aim of national and international policy;
(c) all national and international policies and measures, in particular those
of an economic and financial character, should be judged in this light
and accepted only in so far as they may be held to promote and not to
hinder the achievement of this fundamental objective;
(d) it is a responsibility of the International Labour Organization to examine and consider all international economic and financial policies and
measures in the light of this fundamental objective; . . .
III

The Conference recognizes the solemn obligation of the International
Labour Organization to further among the nations of the world programmes
which will achieve:
(a) full employment and the raising of standards of living;
(b) the employment of workers in the occupations in which they can have
the satisfaction of giving the fullest measure of their skill and attainments and make their greatest contribution to the common well-being;
(c) the provision, as a means to the attainment of this end and under
adequate guarantees for all concerned, of facilities for training and
the transfer of labour, including migration for employment and
settlement;
(d) policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of
work calculated to ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all, and
a minimum living wage to all employed and in need of such protection;
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(e) the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the
cooperation of management and labour in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency, and the collaboration of workers and
employers in the preparation and application of social and economic measures;
(f) the extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to
all in need of such protection and comprehensive medical care;
(g) adequate protection for the life and health of workers in all occupations;
(h) provision for child welfare and maternity protection;
(i) the provision of adequate nutrition, housing and facilities for recreation and culture;
(j) the assurance of equality of educational and vocational opportunity. . . .

Notes
1. Do the principles listed in the 1944 Declaration continue to be relevant?
Think of the laws and public policies of a country you are familiar with.
How do they measure up against the grand aspirations of the Declaration of Philadelphia? While most of the Philadelphia Declaration’s goals
are germane today, the document does not offer guidance on the
mechanisms for achieving them. For example, the Declaration’s aims
are not tied directly to the adoption of particular conventions. This first
ILO Declaration, with its far-reaching ambitions, and the absence of a
road map for accomplishing them, stands in contrast with the more
narrow and pragmatic 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, which is excerpted below. Broader aims, however, are
discernible in the third ILO Declaration, the 2008 Declaration on Social
Justice for a Fair Globalization, also covered below. After reviewing all
three Declarations, query whether the ILO has today circled back to the
expansive view of its role first set forth in the Philadelphia Declaration.
2. What kind of instrument is the Philadelphia Declaration? It is not
considered a treaty. It is an annex to the ILO Constitution. Do its
text and placement give guidance on the Declaration’s effect on member
countries? Article V of the Declaration states ‘‘that the principles
set forth in this Declaration are fully applicable to all peoples
everywhere. . . .’’ ILO Constitution, Annex, Art. V. Professor Charles
Morris argues that ILO membership commits the member states to
an affirmative obligation to further the Declaration’s objectives, a conclusion he believes was later confirmed by the 1998 ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE
BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE 142 (2005).
3. As noted in Chapter 1, human rights are traditionally conceptualized as
falling into two categories: (1) civil and political rights; and (2) economic, social, and cultural rights. Does the Philadelphia Declaration
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contain references to both types of rights? How would you describe the
1944 Declaration’s treatment of the relationship between civil and economic rights?
4. An interesting feature of the Declaration of Philadelphia is Article III’s
objective of furthering national programs of full employment. One such
ultimately unsuccessful national effort was the Full Employment Act of
1945, which sought to create in the United States an entitlement to fulltime employment and a corresponding obligation on the part of the
federal government to maintain conditions to make the entitlement a
reality. Its sponsors, influenced by writings of economist John Maynard
Keynes, believed that business cycles of boom and bust were inevitable,
could be catastrophically socially disruptive, and were capable of
stabilization through a method known as ‘‘compensatory finance.’’ As
described by economist G. J. Santoni:
Section 3 [of the Act] laid out a formula for the federal government to
follow in pursuing this goal. The formula required the President of the
United States to submit a national budget to Congress at the beginning
of each regular session. The budget was to contain a forecast of both the
level of output necessary to generate full employment over the next year
and the level of output that was likely to result if government did not
intervene. If the projected level of output was less than the level necessary
for full employment, the President was required to recommend legislation that would produce a big enough deficit in the federal government’s
budget to raise output to the full employment level. If the relationship
between the two output forecasts were reversed, the President was
required to recommend legislation that would result in a budget surplus
big enough to reduce output to the full employment level.

G. J. Santoni, The Employment Act of 1946: Some History Notes, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Nov. 1986, 5, 9, available at http://research.
stlouisfed.org/publications/review/86/11/Employment_Nov1986.pdf.
The bill was attacked as un-American and socialistic. Subsequent
amendments eliminated the right to full employment, the federal government’s obligation to create conditions conducive to full employment,
and the requirement of budgeting through compensatory finance. Id. at
11. The bill passed as the Employment Act of 1946. Id. at 12. The Humphrey/Hawkins Bill of 1976, an attempted revival of the central aspects of
the 1945 bill, fared no better than its predecessor. Id. at 15.

1. The ILO in the Post-War Period
Sir Bob Hepple identifies decolonization and the Cold War as the two main
challenges confronting the ILO in the period following the Second World War.
The former more than tripled the ILO’s membership in a little over 50 years,
taking it ‘‘[f]rom an elite of 52 mainly western industrial states in 1946’’ to its

69

70

Chapter 2

&

The International Labour Organization and International Labor Standards

present composition of 183 member nations, many of which are poor, developing countries. Hepple notes:
This mass admission of developing countries had profound repercussions.
Their main preoccupation was with technical co-operation, such as assistance
with the drafting of labour codes, which would help them to claim compliance
with international standards although the reality was often much different.

HEPPLE, supra, at 34. The developing nations also put increased pressure on the
agency for flexibility in standard setting, and emphasized political issues like
the activities of multinational corporations and states whose policies they
deemed objectionable, such as those of Israel and the apartheid regime of South
Africa. Id.
The Cold War, in turn, hampered the ILO’s functioning due to strife
between Western and Communist nations. Western countries argued that
the ILO’s principle of tripartism, which requires member countries to staff
their delegations not only with government functionaries but also with
independent workers’ and employers’ representatives, was threatened by the
Soviet Union and its allies. Those countries, after all, had governments that
neither permitted independent labor organizations nor private employment.
Id. When ILO committees ruled that practices of the Communist countries,
such as the ‘‘trade union monopoly, . . . and rules concerning ‘social parasitism,’’’ violated the ILO’s conventions on freedom of association and forced
labor, the Communist bloc countries leveled charges of Western bias at the
ILO’s supervisory machinery and sought to change it. Id.
During the Cold War, the United States, which waited to join the ILO until
1934, grew increasingly disenchanted with the organization. From the U.S.
perspective, the agency had become too politicized. The United States took
particular issue with the ILO’s denunciations of South Africa and Israel, the
ILO’s criticism of the United States for its involvement in Vietnam, its approval
of observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and its perceived
willingness to disregard the Soviet Union’s record on human rights violations.
In 1977, the United States withdrew from the ILO, citing, inter alia, these issues
but vowing to return when its concerns were effectively addressed. As a country
that contributed 25 percent of the ILO’s budget, the U.S. withdrawal represented a means of applying political and economic pressure to the agency. By
1980, the United States sensed enough movement on some of its concerns to
rejoin the ILO. Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States’ Participation in the ILO:
Redefining the Role, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 48, 68-71 (1989).
In 1984, the ILO, acting on a complaint of the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions (ICTWU), reported on Poland’s dissolution of the free
trade union Solidarność as a violation of freedom of association. This
watershed event ‘‘sent shockwaves not just through the Soviet-dominated
countries of Central and Eastern Europe but throughout the world.’’ John
P. Windmuller, Stephen K. Pursey & Jim Baker, The International Trade Union
Movement, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 71, 91 (10th ed., Roger Blanpain ed., 2010). The ILO’s
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contribution in safeguarding union rights in Poland during this period, and
striking a blow against the concept of Communist Party control over organized
labor, is widely acknowledged. Oliver Clarke, Greg J. Bamber & Russell D.
Lansbury, Conclusions: Towards a Synthesis of International and Comparative
Experience in Employment Relations, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 294, 318 (3d ed., Greg J. Bamber & Russell D. Lansbury
eds., 2003). In the end, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the overthrow of
Communism in Eastern Europe saw an end to that particular brand of ideological warfare within the ILO.
The end of the Cold War also prompted the ILO to reevaluate its mission,
key values, and end results. Bellace, supra, at 12-13. Critics challenged an
approach that emphasized the adoption and ratification of conventions, noting
low ratifications of newer conventions and the accumulation of older conventions perceived as obsolete. Id. at 13. In response, the ILO Director-General in
1994 presented a strategy for the agency focusing on seven foundational conventions, which form the basis of the four fundamental human rights articulated
in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted by
the ILO’s International Labour Conference in 1998. ILO member countries, even
those that have not ratified the presently recognized eight fundamental conventions, must respect, promote, and realize these principles. ARTURO BRONSTEIN,
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW: CURRENT CHALLENGES 101 (2009).

ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work
Adopted June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233 (1998)

Whereas the ILO was founded in the conviction that social justice is essential to
universal and lasting peace;
Whereas economic growth is essential but not sufficient to ensure equity, social
progress and the eradication of poverty, confirming the need for the ILO to
promote strong social policies, justice and democratic institutions; . . .
Whereas, in seeking to maintain the link between social progress and economic
growth, the guarantee of fundamental principles and rights at work is of
particular significance in that it enables the persons concerned to claim freely
and on the basis of equality of opportunity their fair share of the wealth which
they have helped to generate, and to achieve fully their human potential;
Whereas the ILO is the constitutionally mandated international organization
and the competent body to set and deal with international labour standards,
and enjoys universal support and acknowledgement in promoting fundamental rights at work as the expression of its constitutional principles;
Whereas it is urgent, in a situation of growing economic interdependence, to
reaffirm the immutable nature of the fundamental principles and rights
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embodied in the Constitution of the Organization and to promote their
universal application;
The International Labour Conference,
1. Recalls:
(a) that in freely joining the ILO, all Members have endorsed the principles
and rights set out in its Constitution and in the Declaration of Philadelphia, and have undertaken to work towards attaining the overall
objectives of the Organization to the best of their resources and fully in
line with their specific circumstances;
(b) that these principles and rights have been expressed and developed in
the form of specific rights and obligations in Conventions recognized
as fundamental both inside and outside the Organization.
2. Declares that all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the
Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights
which are the subject of those Conventions, namely:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation. . . .
4. Decides that, to give full effect to this Declaration, a promotional follow-up,
which is meaningful and effective, shall be implemented in accordance with the
measures specified in the annex hereto, which shall be considered as an integral
part of this Declaration.
5. Stresses that labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade
purposes, and that nothing in this Declaration and its follow-up shall be
invoked or otherwise used for such purposes; in addition, the comparative
advantage of any country should in no way be called into question by this
Declaration and its follow-up.

Notes
1. As noted above, prior to the adoption of the Declaration, seven conventions were identified as being fundamental; an eighth was adopted
in 1999. HEPPLE, supra, at 57. Two of the fundamental conventions fall
under each of the Declaration’s four fundamental rights categories.
These eight fundamental conventions are instruments that do not bind
member states until they are ratified by them.

B. The ILO Declarations

2. Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are tied
to two conventions: Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948); and Convention No. 98
(Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, 1949). Convention
No. 87 provides:
Workers and employers . . . shall have the right to establish and . . . to
join organisations of their own choosing. . . . Each Member [State] . . .
undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure
that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organise.

Convention No. 98 provides:
Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union
discrimination in respect of their employment. . . . Measures . . .
shall be taken . . . to encourage and promote the full development
and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between
employers or employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations,
with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment
by means of collective agreements.

Keep these two conventions in mind as you review the workplace laws
of various national jurisdictions. Do those laws pass muster? As of July
2011, 150 countries have ratified Convention No. 87. In comparison,
160 countries have ratified Convention No. 98.
3. Convention No. 29 (Forced Labour, 1930) and Convention No. 105
(Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957) are the touchstones for the second
fundamental right, the elimination of forced or compulsory labor.
Convention No. 29 provides:
Each Member [State] . . . undertakes to suppress the use of forced or
compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible
period. . . . [T]he term forced or compulsory labour shall mean all
work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace
of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself
voluntarily.

Convention No. 105 provides:
Each Member [State] . . . undertakes to suppress and not to make
use of any form of forced or compulsory labour as a means of political coercion or education . . . as a method of mobilising and using
labour for purposes of economic development; as a means of labour
discipline; as a punishment for having participated in strikes; as a
means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.

You will note, inter alia, that Convention No. 29 is relevant to the
Article 26 complaint filed against Myanmar discussed infra. Likewise,
Convention No. 105 is at issue in the Article 24 representation filed
against Senegal discussed below. As for ratifications, as of July 2011,
Convention No. 29 has been ratified by 175 countries; Convention
No. 105 has been ratified by 169 countries.
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4. The effective abolition of child labor category is tied to Convention
No. 138 (Minimum Age, 1973) and Convention No. 182 (Worst
Forms of Child Labour, 1999). Convention No. 138 provides:
Each Member [State] . . . undertakes to pursue a national policy
designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labour and to
raise progressively the minimum age for admission to employment
or work to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental
development of young persons.

Convention No. 182, which is excerpted in Chapter 1 and discussed in
the notes following it, provides:
Each Member [State] which ratifies this Convention shall take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination
of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency. . . . [T]he
term the worst forms of child labour comprises . . . all forms of
slavery or practices similar to slavery, . . . including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; the use,
procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of
pornography or for pornographic performances; the use, procuring
or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs . . . work which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health,
safety or morals of children.

As of July 2011, Convention No. 138 has been ratified by 161 countries.
Convention No. 182 has been ratified by 174 countries.
5. Finally, the elimination of discrimination obligation references Convention No. 100 (Equal Remuneration, 1951) and Convention
No. 111 (Discrimination — Employment and Occupation, 1958).
Convention No. 100 provides:
Each Member [State] shall, by means appropriate to the methods in
operation for determining rates of remuneration, promote and, in so
far as is consistent with such methods, ensure the application to all
workers of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women
workers for work of equal value.

Convention No. 111, which is at issue in the Individual Observation
regarding India, infra, provides:
Each Member [State] . . . undertakes to declare and pursue a
national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to
national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, with a view to
eliminating any discrimination. . . .

Note 1 following the Individual Observation regarding India excerpts
Convention No. 111’s definition of discrimination. In terms of ratifications, as of July 2011, 168 countries have ratified Convention
No. 100. Convention No. 111 has been ratified by 169 countries.
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6. Sir Bob Hepple describes the chief effect of the 1998 Declaration’s
adoption as significantly boosting the number of ratifications of the
eight fundamental conventions. Id. at 60. By July 2011, 135 countries
had ratified all 8 fundamental conventions.
7. Situating the Declaration’s adoption historically, Professor Brian Langille notes:
[T]he modern international consensus on the core labour rights took
shape in the 1990s as a result of the international community’s
endorsement of the idea in a number of fora — . . . from the ILO’s
point of view most critically at the WTO [World Trade Organization]
Singapore Ministerial of 1996. The context of that meeting was very
much the large public debate about a [WTO] ‘‘social clause’’ . . .
precisely to get some real teeth into the international labour standards
regime. . . . [I]n its over-energetic efforts to expel the labour issue
from its agenda and deliberations, the WTO membership and the
Singapore Declaration . . . used some very strong language to propel
the issue back into the ILO’s court by reasserting its views on the
importance of the core rights dimension of globalization and the
leading role of the ILO in managing that issue.

Brian A. Langille, Core Labour Rights — The True Story (Reply to
Alston), 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 409, 420-21 (2005) (hereinafter Langille,
The True Story). To its credit, argues Langille, the ILO seized the
opportunity, realized that there was a need to be met, and created
the Declaration to meet it. Id. at 421. For more information on the
WTO Singapore Ministerial of 1996, including the opposition of
developing nations to the adoption of a WTO ‘‘social clause,’’ see
Chapter 1, section C.1.c (The World Trade Organization and Labor
Rights).
8. That member states may pledge fealty to the Declaration without ratifying the fundamental conventions raises the question of the relationship between the Declaration’s core labor standards and the
instruments used as their touchstones. Professor Philip Alston argues
that while some linkage between the Declaration and the fundamental
conventions is obviously contemplated, the content of the conventions
cannot simply be read into the Declaration. Non-ratifying states would
never have supported the adoption of the Declaration if it were seen as
a back door way of binding them to the conventions. Philip Alston,
‘‘Core Labour Standards’’ and the Transformation of the International
Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 457, 490-95 (2004).
9. One possibility, which concerns Alston, is that the Declaration is
nothing more than an aspirational policy statement that allows member states to escape the detailed prescriptions of legally binding conventions and yet claim adherence more generally to ILO standards. Id.
at 490-95. Does this theory explain the enthusiasm of the United States
for the Declaration even though it has ratified only two of the
fundamental conventions? The two fundamental conventions ratified
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by the United States are Convention No. 105 on forced labor and
Convention No. 182 on the worst forms of child labor.
10. Another point of controversy regarding the Declaration involves those
standards considered fundamental human rights by some commentators but that were not enumerated as part of the ILO’s core. By designating some standards as central, has the ILO thereby minimized the
importance of other equally vital employment concerns? Professor
Michael Zimmer advocates embracing decent work with a living
wage as an ILO fundamental labor principle. Michael J. Zimmer,
Decent Work with a Living Wage, in The Global Labour Market: From
Globalization to Flexicurity, 65 BULL. COMP. LAB. RELS. 61-80 (Roger
Blanpain & Michele Tiraboschi eds., 2008). Similarly, Professor Sarah
Cleveland argues that providing subsistence wages, protection from
ultra-hazardous workplace conditions, and protection for migrant
workers should be considered core labor standards. Sarah H. Cleveland, Why International Labor Standards?, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR
STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 129, 15659 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003).
11. A succinct statement on the connection between occupational safety
and health, on the one hand, and fundamental rights at work on the
other, was made on June 29, 2008 in the Seoul Declaration on Safety
and Health at Work, an instrument adopted at the world’s first highlevel Safety and Health Summit, and signed by close to 50 high-level
decision makers from around the world, including ILO Executive
Director for Social Protection Assane Diop. Described subsequently
by the ILO as a welcome and unprecedented document, the Declaration on Safety and Health at Work includes the following statement:
‘‘[T]he right to a safe and healthy working environment should be
recognized as a fundamental human right.’’ Seoul Declaration on
Safety and Health at Work, June 29, 2008, available at http://www.
ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—dcomm/documents/
statement/wcms_095910.pdf. The Declaration on Safety and Health at
Work is not an ILO instrument. Nor does it definitively state that safe
work is a human right. Might the Seoul Declaration be a step toward
global recognition of such a right within the ILO?
12. Clearly, the Declaration, which is not a convention or a recommendation, is an interesting and important ILO initiative. Does it represent
a trend away from legally binding conventions in favor of ‘‘softer’’ soft
law tools such as declarations and voluntary codes of conduct? Professor Virginia Leary finds notable both the ILO’s characterization of
the Declaration as a ‘‘solemn commitment’’ by member states, and the
instrument’s follow-up procedure, which requires non-ratifying states
to submit reports on their progress toward achieving core labor standards. Virginia A. Leary, ‘‘Form Follows Function’’: Formulations of
International Labor Standards — Treaties, Codes, Soft Law, Trade
Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE,
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PUBLIC POLICY 179, 186 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV
eds., 2003).
13. Professor Langille sees the 1998 Declaration as a step toward solving
the crisis that threatened to reduce the ILO to irrelevance. The ILO’s
traditional approach of promulgating detailed standards, embodied
in conventions that either had low ratification rates or were ratified
and then observed by many countries in the breach, is clearly untenable if the agency hopes to effect change on the ground. Langille, The
True Story, at 425-26. By stating in general terms the fundamental
principles that all nations must observe, and then working to help
member states achieve them, the ILO can positively promote conditions of social justice that are a precondition for a nation’s economic
success. Id. at 434. Moreover, by promoting respect for core rights,
conditions are created for the advancement of other non-core concerns such as minimum wages, maximum hours, and health and
safety. Id. at 435.
14. Since adopting the 1998 Declaration, the ILO has described its primary
goal as that of securing ‘‘decent work’’ for all people. The four strategic
objectives encompassed within the decent work program are (1) promoting rights at work; (2) creating actual employment opportunities
of acceptable quality; (3) obtaining and enhancing social protection
for the risk of job loss; and (4) promoting social dialogue, a term
encompassing tripartism but also accounting for opportunities for
workers’ and employers’ representatives to engage in formal or informal discussions without the presence of government. Juan Somavia,
Report of the Director-General (ILO 1999).
AND

2. The ILO Tackles Globalization and
the Great Recession
The early years of the twenty-first century saw the ILO at work shaping the
dialogue on the costs and benefits of globalization, and the need to better
manage increasing economic integration among the world’s nations. To that
end, the ILO’s World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization
was formed in February 2002. Two years later, after exhaustive research, the
26-person Commission published its final report, A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All (ILO 2004). While acknowledging globalization’s
potential to generate vast economic gains, the Commission’s report warned
that many countries and most people were not better off under present systems
of global economic governance.
Publication of the Commission’s report also triggered self-reflection within
the ILO, and a recognition that the organization needed to address its capacity
to meet its traditional objectives, the relevance of its core message, and the
efficacy of its practices. Francis Maupin, New Foundation or New Façade? The
ILO and the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 20 EUR. J.
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INT’L L. 823, 829-30 (2009). Discussions ultimately resulted in the adoption of
the 2008 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization. As
Director-General Juan Somavia put it, ‘‘Just as the Declaration of Philadelphia
was a response in May 1944 to the challenges of post-war reconstruction, the
new Declaration is an expression of the relevance of the responses social
dialogue at its best can produce to today’s challenges of globalization.’’ Juan
Somavia, Reply by the Director-General to the Discussion of His Report, Sept. 2,
2008, at 3.

ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization
Adopted June 10, 2008,

I.L.M.

(2008)

I. SCOPE AND PRINCIPLES

The Conference recognizes and declares that:
A. In the context of accelerating change, the commitments and efforts of
Members and the Organization to implement the ILO’s constitutional
mandate, including through international labour standards, and to
place full and productive employment and decent work at the centre
of economic and social policies, should be based on the four equally
important strategic objectives of the ILO, through which the Decent
Work Agenda is expressed and which can be summarized as follows:
(i) promoting employment by creating a sustainable institutional and
economic environment in which:
— individuals can develop and update the necessary capacities and
skills they need to enable them to be productively occupied for
their personal fulfillment and the common well-being;
— all enterprises, public or private, are sustainable to enable
growth and the generation of greater employment and income
opportunities and prospects for all; and
— societies can achieve their goals of economic development, good
living standards and social progress;
(ii) developing and enhancing measures of social protection — social
security and labour protection — which are sustainable and
adapted to national circumstances, including:
— the extension of social security to all, including measures to
provide basic income to all in need of such protection, and
adapting its scope and coverage to meet the new needs and
uncertainties generated by the rapidity of technological, societal, demographic and economic changes;
— healthy and safe working conditions; and
— policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work, designed to ensure a just share of the fruits of
progress to all and a minimum living wage to all employed and
in need of such protection;
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(iii) promoting social dialogue and tripartism as the most appropriate
methods for:
— adapting the implementation of the strategic objectives to the
needs and circumstances of each country;
— translating economic development into social progress, and
social progress into economic development;
— facilitating consensus building on relevant national and
international policies that impact on employment and decent
work strategies and programmes; and
— making labour law and institutions effective, including in
respect of the recognition of the employment relationship, the
promotion of good industrial relations and the building of
effective labour inspection systems; and
(iv) respecting, promoting and realizing the fundamental principles
and rights at work, which are of particular significance, as both
rights and enabling conditions that are necessary for the full realization of all of the strategic objectives, noting:
— that freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining are particularly important to
enable the attainment of the four strategic objectives; and
— that the violation of fundamental principles and rights at work
cannot be invoked or otherwise used as a legitimate comparative
advantage and that labour standards should not be used for
protectionist trade purposes.
B. The four strategic objectives are inseparable, interrelated and mutually
supportive. The failure to promote any one of them would harm progress towards the others. To optimize their impact, efforts to promote
them should be part of an ILO global and integrated strategy for decent
work. Gender equality and non-discrimination must be considered to
be cross-cutting issues in the abovementioned strategic objectives.
C. How Members achieve the strategic objectives is a question that must be
determined by each Member subject to its existing international obligations and the fundamental principles and rights at work with due
regard, among others, to:
(i) the national conditions and circumstances, and needs as well as
priorities expressed by representative organizations of employers
and workers;
(ii) the interdependence, solidarity and cooperation among all Members of the ILO that are more pertinent than ever in the context of a
global economy; and
(iii) the principles and provisions of international labour standards.

Notes
1. The new Declaration marks the third time the ILO has issued a major
statement of principles and policies and should be read along with the
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Declaration of Philadelphia (1944) and the Declaration of
Fundamental Principles of Rights at Work (1998). Together the
three declarations provide a foundation and methodology by which
the ILO implements its constitutional objectives. Juan Somavia, Director-General’s Announcement, Aug. 13, 2008, at 1. The 2008 Declaration also underscores two key principles: (1) the universality of the
ILO’s Decent Work Agenda, which requires member states to pursue
four objectives (employment, social protection, social dialogue, and
fundamental principles and rights at work); and (2) the indivisibility of
the four objectives such that ‘‘[f]ailure to promote any one . . . hinders
progress towards achieving the others.’’ Id. at 2.
The 2008 Declaration positions ‘‘decent work’’ as a goal central to the
ILO’s work and to the social and economic policies of ILO member
states. Yet when first articulated in 1999, ‘‘decent work’’ was an intentionally vague construct. Maupin, supra, at 838-39. Since the ILO’s
adoption of the 2008 Declaration, and the advent of the global economic crisis, which began in autumn 2008, ‘‘decent work’’ has gained
conceptual clarity. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Introduction: Decent Work in a
Post-Recessionary World, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1-2 (2011). From
the beginning of and throughout the crisis, for example, the ILO made
‘‘decent work’’ the centerpiece of its recommended strategy, issuing
numerous reports on how the concept can form the basis for sustainable recovery and job growth. Id.
Professor Janice Bellace argues that the connection between ‘‘decent
work,’’ as expressed in the 2008 Declaration, and the 1998 Declaration
of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, is discovered by tracing the ILO’s commitment to social justice back to its founding. The
ILO’s purposes and goals serve as a link between the human rights
principles expressed in the 1998 Declaration and the proactive stance
of the ILO’s decent work program. Understood correctly, ‘‘decent
work’’ describes ‘‘the conditions which must exist for workers to be
able to enjoy the human rights guaranteed them. . . .’’ Bellace, supra, at
27. Social justice requires rights in action not in the abstract; hence
workers ‘‘are able to enjoy the observance of their rights only under
conditions of ‘Decent Work.’’’ Id. at 28.
In what way does the 2008 Declaration espouse broader goals than
the 1998 Declaration? Do you think it harkens back to the 1944
Philadelphia Declaration’s lofty aspirations? In what way is the
2008 Declaration more pragmatic than the Philadelphia Declaration?
Do Professor Bellace’s observations above assist in answering these
questions?
The last of the 2008 Declaration’s four strategic objectives invokes the
1998 Declaration’s fundamental principles and rights at work. Can you
tell whether the 2008 Declaration recommends adopting particular
conventions to realize its aims? At the least, is there an implicit injunction to ratify the eight fundamental conventions?
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6. Note that the ILO’s most recently adopted convention embraces the
concept of decent work in its text. Convention No. 189 (Domestic
Workers, 2011), which obligates ratifying countries to promote the
fundamental rights of household workers, also requires member states
to ‘‘take measures to ensure that domestic workers, like workers generally, enjoy fair terms of employment as well as decent working conditions and, if they reside in the household, decent living conditions
that respect their privacy.’’ Convention No. 189, Article 6. For a comprehensive treatment of the legal obstacles and solutions to sub-par
conditions confronting those laboring in domestic service work, see,
e.g., Peggie R. Smith, Work Like Any Other, Work Like No Other: Establishing Decent Work for Domestic Service Workers, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 159 (2011).
7. ‘‘Decent work’’ is useful as a lens for understanding many of the problems confronting the global workforce, including the challenges of
older workers, see, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Andrew Frazer & Malcolm
Sargeant, Decent Work, Older Workers and Vulnerability in the Economic Recession: A Comparative Study of Australia, the United Kingdom
and the United States, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 43 (2011), and the
difficulty of establishing a transnational union movement, see, e.g.,
Michael J. Zimmer, Unions and the Great Recession: Is Transnationalism the Answer?, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 123 (2011).
8. Professor Roger Blanpain notes that for over a decade the ILO’s Decent
Work Agenda has coincided with European Union social policy aims.
Roger Blanpain, Decent Work in the European Union: Hard Goals, Soft
Results, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 29, 30. He nonetheless questions
whether the EU has the means and formal competencies to achieve the
lofty goals of its New European Strategy for Jobs and Growth, the socalled Europe Strategy 2020. Id. at 34-42.
9. Recently, Professor Brian Langille has expressed frustration with the
extent to which the ILO continues to devote its limited resources to the
promulgation of detailed, technical conventions and the legal supervisory machinery designed to enforce those instruments. Instead, he
calls for a decisive shift to soft law, with conventions looking more like
declarations, and the supervisory process shifting from an ethos of
enforcement to one of enablement. Brian Langille, Imagining a Post
‘‘Geneva Consensus’’ Labor Law for Post ‘‘Washington Consensus’’ Development, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 523 (2010) (hereinafter Langille,
Post-Geneva Consensus).
10. Anne Trebilcock takes issue with Langille’s characterization of ILO
standard setting and enforcement. She argues that the adoption of
the two most recent declarations, the 1998 Declaration and the
2008 Declaration, evidences the ILO’s willingness to employ flexible
initiatives to facilitate change and improvement. Anne Trebilcock,
Putting the Record Straight about International Labor Standard Setting,
31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 553, 565 (2010). Can the ILO be described
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as acting schizophrenically — maintaining a complex and expensive
labor standards enforcement structure while simultaneously moving
toward soft law mechanisms such as the 1998 and 2008 Declarations?
11. The 2008 Declaration’s follow-up procedure requires a recurrent, thematic schedule of discussions at the annual International Labour Conference based on the Declaration’s four objectives. In June 2010, the
theme was employment promotion. As a prelude and to inform the
discussion, the ILO’s Committee of Experts prepared a General Survey
of six conventions related to employment. ILO Committee of Experts,
2010 General Survey Concerning Employment Instruments (2010).
For the 2011 International Labour Conference, the Committee of
Experts created a General Survey of four conventions related to social
security.
12. Relevant to the General Surveys, Professional Langille reports that in
Canada, his home country, there is concern that the 2008 Declaration’s
follow-up procedures should ‘‘not add to already existing universal
reporting requirements that are viewed as tiresome, unhelpful, and
onerous.’’ Langille, Post-Geneva Consensus, at 539. Anne Trebilcock,
writing more optimistically, hopes that a new use of Article 19 of the
ILO’s Constitution, which requires member states to report on steps
taken vis-à-vis unratified conventions, might lead, through the General
Surveys, to a ‘‘more differentiated, inter-disciplinary, and gender-aware
look into’’ the obstacles states face to ratification of specific conventions.
Trebilcock, supra, at 559-60. With that in mind, this chapter continues
with a discussion of ILO standard setting and structure.

C. ILO Standard Setting and Structure
Since its creation, the ILO has primarily set international labor standards by
adopting conventions and recommendations, both of which may be thought of
as forms of ILO ‘‘legislation.’’ ILO legislation, however, differs from laws passed
by national legislatures. At the time of ILO adoption, neither a convention nor
a recommendation is binding on the member countries.
Nonetheless, while a national government need not accept the ILO’s conventions, it is required to submit them for consideration to the competent
authorities — generally its own legislature — within 18 months, and is subject
to two reporting obligations. HEPPLE, supra, at 30. Article 19 of the ILO Constitution requires member countries to report on the steps they take to bring to
the attention of the competent authorities the existence of new, unratified
conventions. An additional reporting requirement under Article 19 requires
member states, upon request, to detail their law and practice regarding a convention’s subject, and to explain why ratification has been prevented or
delayed. The member country responses to this provision are analyzed in a
general survey of the convention topic. Id. at 48.
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Once ratified by a member state without reservations, a convention is
considered a multilateral treaty containing international obligations. Recommendations, in contrast, are designed to provide guidance only, need not be
ratified by ILO member governments, and do not constrain their actions.
Swepston, International Labour Law, at 143. This latter form of ILO legislation
often supplements a particular convention, providing additional details to
assist member countries in fashioning national policy.
Conventions and recommendations must be approved by two-thirds of the
delegates attending the ILO’s annual International Labour Conference (ILC),
which functions as the quasi-legislative branch of the agency. The unique tripartite structure requires each member nation to send to the annual conference
in June a four-person delegation comprised of two government officials, one
representative of employers’ interests, and one representative of organized
labor, although many countries also send additional individuals as advisers.
A delegation’s employer and worker representatives must be nominated
with the agreement of the most representative organizations for those constituencies in its home country. The U.S. delegation includes a representative from
the U.S. Council for International Business (USCIB), an organization comprised of over 300 multinational corporations, law firms, and business associations, and a delegate from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the voluntary federation of 57 national
and international unions. ILC voting is by secret ballot, with delegates casting
ballots individually. Thus, there is no need for the employer or worker representatives to vote in tandem with their government’s representatives.
Setting the agenda for future ILCs, establishing the program and budget for
the ILC to adopt, reviewing the status of various ILO projects, and electing the
ILO Director-General are the tasks of the Governing Body (GB), which operates as the agency’s board of directors or executive council. It too is tripartite in
composition. Half of its 56 members are drawn from government, and there
are 14 employers’ representatives and 14 individuals representing workers. Ten
of the government seats are reserved for representatives of ten countries
deemed to be of ‘‘chief industrial importance,’’ including the United States.
Other members are elected every three years by the ILC, the government
representatives on a geographically distributed basis, and the others by their
respective constituencies. Swepston, International Labour Law, at 144. The GB
meets three times a year.
The site of the ILO’s overall activities is the agency’s permanent secretariat,
the International Labour Office (the ‘‘Office’’), which is headquartered in
Geneva, Switzerland. Almost 2,000 ILO employees work out of the Geneva
headquarters and in the ILO’s 40 field offices. Missions throughout the world
are also undertaken by the up to 600 ILO experts staffing the agency’s technical
cooperation program. A Director-General, elected to a five-year term, is the
head of the Office. The Office is also the headquarters of the ILO’s substantial
research, documentation, and publication activities. Potter, The ILO, at 85-7.
All three main ILO bodies — the ILC, the GB and the Office — play a role
in setting international labor standards. Promulgation and adoption of a
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convention or recommendation is typically a two-year process. The process
begins with the Office, which prepares a paper each year detailing possible
subjects for action at future ILCs. In light of the paper, the GB may decide
to place a particular subject on the agenda of an ILC to be held in two years’
time. The Office then produces during the first year a global law and practice
report and a questionnaire on the issue. Answers to the questionnaire, provided
by the member nations and employer and labor groups, are the basis for draft
conclusions and a report on the subject for discussion at a first ILC. At the ILC,
a tripartite technical drafting committee amends the draft conclusions, conducts discussions and prepares a new report with conclusions that is submitted
to the conference for approval. Once the report is approved, the ILC places the
matter on the agenda for the next conference.
The report that emerges from discussions at the first conference is used by
the Office to prepare a draft of the proposed instrument — a convention or a
recommendation. The draft instrument is sent for comments by member governments, workers, and employers. These comments are used to prepare a final
report and draft convention or recommendation, which is sent to member
governments in advance of the ILC, and will be discussed, possibly amended,
and ultimately voted upon at the second conference. Id. at 85-10–85-11. Once
adopted by the ILC, a convention enters into force when two member countries
ratify it.
As of June 2011, the ILO had adopted 189 conventions and 201 recommendations. The subjects covered by this international labor code include (1) freedom of association and the right to organize; (2) the abolition of forced labor;
(3) protection from discrimination in employment; (4) child labor; (5) general
employment matters; (6) conditions of work; (7) occupational safety and
health; (8) the employment of women; (9) older workers; (10) migrant workers; (11) seafarers; and (12) labor administration, including inspection and the
compilation of statistics. Swepston, International Labour Law, at 151-64. The
most recently adopted convention, Convention No. 189 (Domestic Workers,
2011), and its accompanying Recommendation No. 201 (Domestic Workers,
2011) were adopted on June 16, 2011 by an overwhelming majority of ILO ILC
delegates.
Although the depth and breadth of the ILO’s corpus juris is impressive,
some commentators query whether there are too many standards of questionable quality and relevance. Creighton, supra, at 257-59; Efren Córdova, Some
Reflections on the Overproduction of International Labour Standards, 14 COMP.
LAB. L.J. 138 (1993). Also of concern are the uneven ratification rates among
conventions and countries. Some conventions have high levels of ratification
while the vast majority receives little attention. Potter, The ILO, at 85-12.
Moreover, member states vary considerably in their receptivity to ratification.
Unlike most of its industrial counterparts, for example, the United States has
ratified only 14 conventions, 2 of which are no longer in force. The U.S. ratification rate is one of the lowest in the world.
The ILO’s initiative to revise and integrate its conventions acknowledges
and responds to criticism that the proliferation of ILO labor standards has
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proven counterproductive for the agency. Over time, the ILO has engaged in
less standard setting through the adoption of conventions. Sir Bob Hepple
notes that in the ILO’s first two decades, a little over three conventions were
adopted each year. In contrast, from 1997-2004, only five conventions were
adopted — none in 1998, 2002, and 2004. HEPPLE, supra, at 35.

D. ILO Monitoring and Member Nation
Compliance
International labor standards are enforced by the ILO in two main ways: through
the examination of reports and through the consideration of complaints. As
noted above, conventions do not bind the member states unless they are ratified.
Once ratified, however, the member country must maintain its national law and
practice in conformity with the convention, which is considered a treaty.
In some countries, ratification makes the convention part of national law,
enforceable at the national level. Most ILO conventions are not drafted as
self-executing, however, and instead require supplementary enacting legislation
to be passed by the member country’s legislature to bring about a direct national
effect. Swepston, International Labour Law, at 162.
Article 22 of the ILO Constitution sets forth the obligations of all member
states that ratify conventions:
Each of the Members agrees to make an annual report to the International
Labour Office on the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a party. These reports shall be made in such
form and shall contain such particulars as the Governing Body may request.

ILO Constitution, Article 22.
Although the express wording of Article 22 refers to an annual report, in
practice the intervals in which the reports on various conventions are due are
longer. Typically, reports are requested at two- or five-year intervals. HEPPLE,
supra, at 48. Eight fundamental conventions that are the touchstones of the
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work generally require
reporting every two years. So too do four so-called priority conventions
covering labor inspection (No. 81), employment policy (No. 122), labor
inspection in agriculture (No. 129), and tripartite consultation at the national
level (No. 144). Reports on all other ratified conventions are due every five
years. Potter, The ILO, at 85-17–85-18. In November 2009, the Governing
Body decided to increase to three years the reporting cycle for the fundamental
and priority conventions but to leave the cycle intact for other conventions at
five-year intervals. Implementation of this change, as well as grouping conventions for reporting purposes by subjects keyed to the four strategic objectives of
the Declaration on Social Justice, is expected in 2012. General Report of the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 2011, at ô 29.
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1. Committee of Experts on the Application
of Conventions and Recommendations
Article 22 reports are reviewed by the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), a body of at
present 20 distinguished individuals, including judges, academics, and lawyers,
who meet once a year in December. Approximately 2,000 reports are reviewed
annually. The CEACR also reviews submissions from employer and workers
groups, and may examine national law, court decisions, collective bargaining
agreements, and other relevant texts. Potter, The ILO, at 85-19. A country
deemed to fall short of full compliance with a ratified convention may receive
from the CEACR a ‘‘direct request’’ soliciting additional or clarifying information on points of concern. Another mechanism by which the CEACR makes
known its initial conclusions about convention noncompliance is by issuing
‘‘observations’’ in its annual report to the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, a tripartite committee of the ILC that meets each June
during the annual conference. The observations are also sent to the countries
whose actions prompt them.

CEACR: Individual Observation Concerning Convention
No. 111, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
1958 India (ratification: 1960) Published: 2005

Discrimination on the basis of social origin
1. In its 2002 observation, the Committee had referred to a communication
from the [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions] ICFTU dated
2 September 2002 and to the Government’s reply, which had been received
during the Committee’s session, on 3 December 2002. The Committee notes
that an additional reply was received on 19 December 2002.
2. The communication of the ICFTU referred to the practice of manual
scavenging, i.e. the removal of human and animal excreta from public and
private latrines and open sewers. Manual scavenging is performed almost
exclusively by Dalits (also known as untouchables) and according to government statistics, an estimated 1 million Dalits in India are manual scavengers.
Women clean public latrines daily, removing the excrement with brooms and
small tin plates and piling it into baskets which are carried on the head to
faraway locations. Manual scavengers may also be engaged in underground
sewage work, or in cleaning faeces from the railway systems, or in the disposal
of dead animals. They work for state municipalities or for private employers.
They are exposed to the most virulent forms of viral and bacterial infections,
including tuberculosis. They may be paid as little as 12 rupees (US$0.30) a day,
for unlimited hours. Sometimes, they do not receive their pay.
3. According to the ICFTU, the allocation of labour on the basis of caste is a
fundamental part of the caste system. Within the caste system, Dalits, who are
considered ‘‘polluted’’ from birth, are assigned, through threats and coercion,
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tasks and occupations which are deemed ritually polluting by other caste communities, such as scavenging. Refusal to perform such tasks can lead to physical
abuse, social boycott and exclusion from any other form of employment. This
practice is described as clearly discrimination on the basis of social origin, as
defined in Article 1 of the Convention.
4. The ICFTU alleges that, although legislation was enacted in 1993 to
prohibit the employment of manual scavengers and the construction of dry
latrines and funds exist for the construction of flush latrines and the rehabilitation of scavengers under a government national scheme, the employment of
Dalits as manual scavengers continues throughout India. . . .
5. The ICFTU submits that the Government of India has failed to fulfil (sic)
its obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to pursue a policy to eliminate
discrimination in employment, and its obligation under Article 3(d) to implement this policy in respect of employment under the direct control of a
national authority. . . .
6. In its reply dated 2 December 2002, the Government states that the
eradication of manual scavenging is a matter of priority concern for the Government of India. It recognizes that manual scavenging still exists in certain
pockets, due mainly to unchanged societal structures and mores. In order to
resolve the problem of dry latrines, the Government has enacted a central
legislation — the Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of
Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993, which came into force in 1997 — and
it has made every effort to implement the Act in full earnest. . . .
[The observation notes that the Government referenced two programs
aimed at converting dry latrines into low-cost flush latrines, and providing
alternative employment to ‘‘liberated scavengers.’’ Under the programs, over
437,000 scavengers have been liberated and over 154,000 trained for alternative
occupations.]
10. The Committee notes that in the practice of manual scavenging, persons belonging to a certain social group called the Dalits, are usually engaged
on account of their social origin. This constitutes discrimination, as defined in
Article 1, paragraph 1(a), of the Convention.
11. The Committee takes note of the Government’s statement that the
eradication of manual scavenging in the country is a matter of priority concern
for the Government. It notes that the Employment of Manual Scavengers and
Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993, punishes the employment of persons for manually carrying human excreta and the construction or
maintenance of dry latrines with imprisonment and/or a fine, and that a
number of schemes have existed for a number of years for the construction
of flush latrines and the liberation and rehabilitation of manual scavengers.
12. The Committee notes with concern that despite those measures,
manual scavenging continues to be used in large parts of the country and
large numbers of men and women have still to perform degrading tasks by
reason of social origin and economic circumstances in inhuman conditions, in
contravention of the Convention. The Committee expresses the hope that the
Government will step up its efforts to ensure the prompt elimination of this
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practice and the access of the persons involved to other, more decent, jobs.
In particular, the Committee requests the Government:
— to take measures to ensure that the state, local and railway authorities
apply and enforce the prohibitions contained in the Employment of
Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act,
1993, and that the penalties provided for their violation are effectively
imposed (please provide indications on the number of prosecutions
engaged and the number and nature of penalties imposed);
— to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing schemes for the construction
of flush latrines and the rehabilitation of manual scavengers, taking into
account the reports and recommendations of the competent organs
including the National Commission for Safai Karamcharis [the official
name for manual scavengers] and the National Commission on Scheduled Castes and Tribes; and
— to launch and/or expand public awareness programmes for the population and educational and training programmes for the authorities
involved, in order to promote the changes in mentalities and social
habits which are necessary to bring about the elimination of manual
scavenging.
The Government is requested to provide information on the concrete measures
taken with regard to these matters. . . .

Notes
1. The CEACR specifically references Article 1, paragraph 1(a) of C. 111,
the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, which,
true to its name, prohibits employment discrimination. Article 1,
paragraph 1 of the Convention provides:
1. For the purpose of this Convention the term discrimination includes
a. any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race,
colour sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social
origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of
opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation;
b. such other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect
of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in
employment or occupation as may be determined by the Member
concerned after consultation with representative employers’ and
workers’ organisations, where such exist, and with other appropriate bodies.

Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, June 25,
1958, ILOLEX C111, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/
convdisp1.htm. Paragraph 10 of the 2005 observation notes that the
Dalits are a social group engaged in the occupation of manual
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scavenging because of their social origin. The Committee also concludes
that the plight of the Dalits in this case constitutes discrimination on the
basis of social origin in violation of the Convention. Is the objection of
the CEACR to the relegation of a particular social group to this occupation or to the inhuman nature of the work itself?
2. In 1950, the concept of untouchability was abolished by the Constitution of India. What factors explain the persistence of a despised caste
and the assignment of its members to the worst jobs in the Indian
economy? A recent report published by the Robert F. Kennedy Center
describes the failure of Indian law to eradicate widespread practices
associated with untouchable status, including the segregation of
religious worship, drinking water, housing, and seating in school. Navsarjan Trust and RFK Center, Understanding Untouchability: A Comprehensive Study of Practices and Conditions, Jan. 27, 2010, available at
http://www.rfkcenter.org/untouchability. For information about the
social and legal status of the Dalits, see Chapter 13, section D (‘‘Equal
Opportunities’’ for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other
Backward Classes). See also Ravi Shankar Shukla, Manual Scavenging:
The Story of Untouchables Among Untouchables, Nov. 6, 2009, paper
available via the Social Science Research Network.
3. In its 2005 observation concerning India’s noncompliance with Convention No. 111, the CEACR provided that nation with a list of steps it
wanted India to take to increase the pace at which manual scavenging is
eliminated. The CEACR also expected to receive from India an update
on the measures taken to address this exploitive and discriminatory
occupation. Making a request, however, does not guarantee that the
committee will receive the information. Indeed, in a part of the observation not reproduced above, the CEACR noted that its 2002 observation on sex discrimination in India had included a request that the
government provide statistical data on the educational gap between
Indian boys and girls, statistics on female labor force participation,
and information on the status of the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women, the body that monitors programs aimed at the economic empowerment of women. Instead of supplying the requested
data, the Indian government responded that the information will be
supplied ‘‘as and when it becomes available.’’ CEACR: Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 111, Discrimination (Employment
and Occupation), 1958 India (ratification: 1960) Published 2005, at ô 16.
4. The CEACR’s 2010 observation concerning India’s noncompliance with
Convention No. 111 regarding the Dalits notes that ‘‘the Government
has continued to take measures towards the elimination of the practice
of manual scavenging. However, the Committee expresses serious
concern that, despite these efforts, thousands of Dalit men and women
still find themselves trapped in this inhumane and degrading practice.
The Committee is particularly concerned at the apparent weak enforcement of the Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of
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Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act of 1993, and that the practice even continues in employment under the Government’s authority contrary to
Article 3(d) of the Convention.’’ CEACR: Individual Observation
Concerning Convention No. 111, Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation), 1958 India (ratification: 1960) Published 2010, at 425
(emphasis in original).
5. Monitoring through reporting may seem an odd enforcement mechanism to those used to quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings involving
the possibility of concrete sanctions. The ILO’s reporting procedures, in
contrast, rely on moral suasion and public shaming. Professor Brian
Langille characterizes the ILO supervisory mechanism as ‘‘a decidedly
soft law system.’’ Langille, The True Story, at 413. Yet while the enforcement techniques lack ‘‘teeth’’ in the sense of providing for monetary
sanctions, one must remember that ratified conventions are binding
legal instruments. They thus may be distinguished from purely
voluntary tools, such as some international declarations, guidelines,
or corporate codes of conduct.
6. The number of Article 22 reports received from member states is substantially less than the number requested by the CEACR. For example,
the CEACR requested that a total of 2,745 Article 22 reports be submitted to it by September 1, 2010. It received 1,866 reports or only
67.98 percent of the reports requested. General Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 2011, at ô 34. Moreover, many of the reports received are
submitted late. ‘‘[B]y 1 September 2010, the proportion of reports
received was only 31.4 per cent.’’ Id. at ô 39. Lateness in submitting
reports hampers the functioning of the supervisory process, making it
impossible to consider some cases, which then must be deferred for
examination prior to the next year’s meeting of the ILC.
7. Since 1964, the CEACR has compiled a list of cases in which member
countries exhibit progress in bringing their laws and practice into compliance with ratified conventions after receiving committee comments.
The 2011 report notes the CEACR’s satisfaction that progress was made
in 63 cases in 40 countries. The total list of such cases from
1964 through 2010 numbers 2,803. General Report of the Committee
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,
2011, at ôô 64-65.

2. Conference Committee on the Application
of Standards
After reviewing the annual CEACR report, the Conference Committee on the
Application of Standards (CCAS), the tripartite committee of the ILC that
meets during the annual conference, typically considers about 25 of the
most serious cases detailed. The CCAS then conducts detailed discussions
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with the governments involved in those cases, and adopts conclusions in its
annual report to the ILC. Potter, The ILO, at 85-20.
Many of the cases involve factual circumstances that are shocking. For
example, the 2005 CCAS report provides a synopsis of the discussion involving
Colombia’s violation of Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. At the start of the discussion, a government
representative from Colombia addressed the progress his country had made in
reducing violence directed against labor union leaders:
. . . In the specific case of labour union leaders, whereas in 2002, unfortunately
205 had been murdered, in 2004 the number of murdered trade unionists had
been 89, representing a reduction of 56.58 per cent. . . .
According to the report of the National Prosecutor’s Office for the period
2002-04 on cases currently under investigation for offences of homicide, in
which the victim was associated with a labour union, there had been
36 preventive detentions, 21 charges, four sentences and 131 investigations,
which amounted to significant progress in comparison with ten years ago.

Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, Provisional Record 22, Part II, Ninety-Third Session, Geneva, 2005, Convention 87,
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 Colombia (ratification: 1976).
Despite this progress, the CCAS condemned in the strongest terms all such
acts of violence, and concluded that ‘‘organizations of workers and employers
could exercise their activities in a free and meaningful manner only in a climate
that was free from violence. . . .’’ Id. The Colombian government was exhorted
to redouble its efforts to put an end to a situation that obviously presented a
great obstacle to the realization of the rights guaranteed by Convention No. 87.
Finally, the CCAS decided that a high-level tripartite visit to Colombia by ILO
representatives was necessary. Id.
Conditions affecting Colombian trade unionists clearly fit within the category of the CCAS’s most serious cases. Indeed, Colombia’s record in this
regard, inter alia, for years stymied congressional ratification of the U.S.Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. Len Bracken, Obama, Santos Tout
Colombian Action Plan; Steelworkers, Teamers Express Opposition, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), at A-8 (Apr. 7, 2011). Ultimately, progress by Colombia on labor
rights concerns led to the trade agreement’s passage. On October 21, 2011,
President Obama signed legislation implementing the U.S.-Colombia free
trade agreement. For information about the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement, see Chapter 6.
Some of the other cases categorized by CCAS as serious may strike students
of international labor law as surprising and very revealing. The CCAS’s
consideration in 2005 of the United States’ possible noncompliance with Convention No. 144, Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards),
is such a case. See Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards)
Convention, June 26, 1976, ILOLEX C144, available at http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm.
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Article 2 of Convention No. 144 requires ratifying countries to ‘‘operate
[national level] procedures which ensure effective consultations . . . between
representatives of the government, of employers and of workers’’ on ILOrelated activities. Id. Article 5 of the Convention requires that ‘‘consultation . . .
shall be undertaken at least once a year.’’ Id. The AFL-CIO, in comments
attached to a U.S. government report for the period from 2001 to 2004, alleged
that under the Bush Administration the tripartite consultation process had
ground to a halt. In an individual observation, the CEACR requested the
U.S. government to provide information in its next report on the steps it has
taken to ensure effective consultation and to resolve the issues raised by the
AFL-CIO. Interestingly, the CCAS selected this case as one of the 25 most
serious cases to come before it in 2005.

Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of
Standards, Provisional Record 22, Part II, Ninety-Third
Session, Geneva, 2005, Convention No. 144, Tripartite
Consultation (International Labor Standards)
1976 United States (ratification: 1988)

A [U.S.] Government representative stated that the United States took its
obligations under ratified Conventions very seriously. . . .
She recalled that tripartite arrangements had been established in 1975 when
the United States was contemplating withdrawal from the ILO. There had been
tripartite consultation at the highest level on the decision to withdraw and,
during the period of withdrawal, on whether and when to return. The mechanism was a Cabinet Level Committee that included the President of the AFLCIO and a representative from the United States Chamber of Commerce. Upon
rejoining the ILO in February 1980, the United States formalized the Cabinet
Level Committee as a federal advisory committee called the President’s Committee on the ILO. . . .
The President’s Committee was the pinnacle of the tripartite mechanism
and provided for consultation at the highest level. More continual consultation
occurred through a staff-level consultative group and in the Tripartite Advisory
Panel on International Labour Standards (TAPILS) that was created specifically to examine the legal feasibility of ratifying selected ILO Conventions. One
of the first conventions that TAPILS had examined was Convention
No. 144. . . . The framework for tripartite consultations had not changed since.
The [U.S. government representative] pointed out that this was the first
time that the Committee of Experts had expressed any concern at all about
United States application of the Convention. The question, she noted, was
whether tripartite consultations in the United States were effective. [The
U.S. government representative described the Convention as a flexible promotional instrument that requires consultations but does not specify that they
must take the form of a meeting.]
Turning to the factual issues of the case, [the U.S. government
representative] stated that there had indeed not been a meeting of the
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President’s Committee since May 2000. In fact, since the United States ratified
Convention No. 144 in 1988, the President’s Committee had met on only six
occasions. This was because the President’s Committee only met when warranted by ILO-related issues that required a decision at the highest level. . . . As
a consequence, most ILO consultations were held less formally.
The observation also indicated that the TAPILS did not meet during the
reporting period. [The U.S. government representative] announced that the
Panel had met last month [May 2005] to begin reviewing Convention
No. 185 on Seafarers’ Identity Documents. . . .
With regard to the Committee of Experts’ observation that for the first time
since 1991, the Government had not convened a full meeting of the consultative group in preparation of the 2004 ILO Conference, [the U.S. government
representative] pointed out that the Department of Labor had in fact scheduled
its usual full pre-Conference briefing but learned subsequently that a significant portion of the delegation, particularly from the AFL-CIO, could not
attend. Consequently, the meeting had to be rescheduled at a time that
could include the AFL-CIO, closer to the opening of the Conference, with
more limited attendance. . . . This year, the Government had again hosted a
full tripartite meeting in preparation of the 2005 ILO Conference.
The [CCAS] Worker members recalled that Convention No. 144 set forth
the obligation for ratifying States to establish, in accordance with national
practice, effective tripartite consultations with respect to the matters
concerning the activities of the ILO. To contravene these provisions or to
interpret this instrument in a restrictive manner imperiled the credibility of
trade unions as well as the efficiency of ILO standards. . . . For the past three
years, the Government had not convoked the President’s Committee or the
Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labour Standards (TAPILS), the
bodies intended to implement Convention No. 144. . . . The observation of
the Committee of Experts had established that the Government had clearly
ceased to be active in the tripartite process and had taken no action toward
further ratifications of ILO standards. . . .
The Worker member of India stated that this case was a clear violation of
Convention No. 144. For the first time since 1991, the United States Government had not convened a full consultative group in 2004 in preparation for the
Conference. . . . This lack of this preparation was a violation of democratic
norms and was unbecoming for a country which never failed to project itself
as the champion of democracy. . . .
The Government member of Cuba stated . . . [i]t was clear that greater
attention should be focused on Governments that only ratified a small number
of Conventions. . . .
The Worker member of Pakistan stated that the United States, in its role as
the leader of the developed world and as one of the states of chief industrial
importance in the Governing Body, should play an exemplary role not only in
the ratification of ILO Conventions but in their implementation in letter
and spirit. . . . He concluded by noting that the United States often pressed
for the ratification and implementation of fundamental Conventions in other
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countries. In the light of this, the United States should take the lead in ratifying
and implementing such Conventions itself. . . .
The Committee noted the statement made by the [U.S.] Government
representative and the discussion that followed. The Committee noted that,
in accordance with the Convention and the comments made by the Committee
of Experts in its observation, the Government and the social partners should
establish procedures to ensure effective consultations. . . .
The Committee requested the Government to take all the appropriate measures to promote tripartite dialogue on international labour standards. The
Committee hoped that the Government would provide information in its
next report on the progress made to guarantee the holding in practice of tripartite
consultations in a manner that was satisfactory for all the parties concerned.

Notes
1. Why did the CCAS select the U.S. tripartite consultation case for
review in 2005 as one of the most serious cases? While Convention
No. 144 is considered a ‘‘priority convention,’’ perhaps the situation
was addressable in a less public forum. The CEACR did produce an
individual observation that was forwarded to the U.S. government.
What more is gained by characterizing the case as among the most
serious?
2. As noted above, the U.S. government convened the Tripartite Advisory
Panel on International Labor Standards (TAPILS) in May 2005 to
begin reviewing Convention No. 185 on Seafarers’ Identity Documents, and also held a tripartite meeting of the full consultative
group to prepare for the 2005 ILC. Is this evidence that the ILO’s
enforcement mechanism works?
3. Interestingly, while the United States, at 14 conventions, has one of the
world’s lowest ILO ratification rates, it is considered to be a high
compliance nation; in other words, the CEACR has not often issued
individual observations based on the U.S. government’s actions
regarding its ratified conventions. HEPPLE, supra, at 42. In contrast, the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Norway, and
Finland all have ratified 80 or more conventions but are considered
low-compliance member states. Id. at 40.
4. An obvious subtext in the case is the perceived hypocrisy of the United
States in refusing to ratify most of the ILO’s conventions, yet using the
ILO’s eight fundamental conventions, which act as references to the
1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, as a
touchstone for judging the labor standards of its trading partners,
especially in the context of negotiating free trade agreements. Is
there a different way to interpret U.S. actions in this respect?
5. The U.S. reluctance to ratify ILO conventions has been attributed to a
number of factors. First, during the ILO’s early decades, the U.S. labor
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6.

7.

8.
9.

movement’s approach to securing worker rights centered mainly on
voluntarily negotiating collective bargaining agreements. Excessive
government involvement was seen as antithetical to workers’ interests.
Leary, supra, at 181.
Next, some U.S. policymakers and business people believe that extensive ratification of ILO conventions would ‘‘usurp the jurisdiction of
Congress to establish a National labor policy, and the jurisdiction of
the individual States to regulate labor matters traditionally within their
authority.’’ Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond, Examination
of the Relationship Between the United States and the International
Labor Organization, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 1, p. 5 (1985). Those
espousing this view are especially concerned about ratifying conventions that would require changes in domestic labor and employment
law. Edward E. Potter, A Pragmatic Assessment from the Employers’
Perspective, in WORKERS’ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 118, 134 (James A.
Gross ed., 2003). Is this a valid concern? U.S. policy, even under presidential administrations favorably disposed toward the ILO, has been
to consider ripe for ratification only those conventions that are clearly
non-self-executing, and thus not directly enforceable as U.S. law in
U.S. courts. Moreover, the conventions considered candidates for U.S.
ratification are those that TAPILS concludes require no change in
existing U.S. law.
Some tie the reticence of the United States to its unique system of labor
market regulation, which tends to emphasize individual over collective
rights, and is far more flexible and less protective of employee job
security as compared with other industrialized nations. Lee Swepston,
Closing the Gap Between International Law and U.S. Labor Law, in
WORKERS’ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 55 (James A. Gross ed., 2003).
The ILO’s conventions are seen as in harmony with European
approaches to labor and employment law, and out of step with those
in the United States. Thomas B. Moorhead, U.S. Labor Law Serves Us
Well, in WORKERS’ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 136, 138 (James A. Gross
ed., 2003).
Others ascribe the low U.S. ratification rate to American ‘‘lack of
interest and knowledge of international organizations,’’ and a preference for unilateralism. Leary, supra, at 181-82.
Even where U.S. law is clearly in compliance with an important
fundamental convention, there has been little political will for ratification. As noted by the U.S. government representative in the U.S.
tripartite consultation case:
With regard to Convention No. 111 [Discrimination (Employment
and Occupation)], progress had been slow. On the basis of a finding
by TAPILS that United States law and practice were in full conformity
with its provisions, Convention No. 111 had been forwarded by the
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President in May 1998 to the United States Senate with a request for
advice and consent to ratification. Since then, Convention No. 111
had consistently been on a list of treaties that the Executive Branch
considered to deserve priority attention. The Senate, however, while
apparently not disinclined to consider the Convention, had given
precedence to treaties having a direct bearing on national security.

Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards,
Provisional Record 22, Part II, Ninety-Third Session, Geneva, 2005,
Convention No. 144, Tripartite Consultation (International Labor
Standards), 1976 United States (ratification: 1988). For his part, the
U.S. CCAS worker member complained that ratification of Convention No. 111 was not a priority of the Bush Administration, and that he
would like to see the administration actively lobbying the Senate to
move on the matter. Id.
10. Might a change in presidential administration prompt progress toward
U.S. ratification of Convention No. 111 and compliance with Convention No. 144? On May 4, 2010, Hilda Solis, President Obama’s
Secretary of Labor, hosted the first meeting of the President’s Committee on the International Labor Organization in a decade. The
committee decided to make ratification of Convention No. 111 [Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)] a priority and reviewed
two maritime conventions. On May 20, 2010, TAPILS met for the first
time since 2005. Among other things, TAPILS is developing a shortlist
of ILO Conventions suitable for U.S. ratification. The CEACR noted
with interest the reinvigoration of the U.S. tripartite consultative
process. CEACR: Individual Observation Concerning Convention
No. 144, Tripartite Consultation (International Labor Standards),
1976 United States (ratification: 1988), published 2011, at 489.
11. The Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) carries out the U.S.
Department of Labor’s international responsibilities. ILAB is the U.S.
government’s ‘‘primary point of contact with the ILO,’’ and its activities include preparing U.S. government reports for submission to the
international organization. Report of the Conference Committee on
the Application of Standards, 2005 Convention No. 144: Tripartite
Consultation (International Labor Standards), 1976 United States
(ratification: 1988).
12. What are the costs to U.S. global influence of its policy and practice on
ILO convention ratification? Would pursuing a more aggressive ratification policy jeopardize U.S. interests?

3. Adversarial Procedures
The ILO supervisory mechanism also has two forms of adversarial procedures.
One involves the filing of representations. The other provides for the filing of
complaints.
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a. Filing Representations under Article 24
Article 24 of the ILO Constitution allows workers’ or employers’ organizations
to file representations to the GB that a particular member country is not
effectively observing a convention it has ratified. Swepston, International
Labour Law, at 164. If the representation is found receivable, the GB establishes
a three-person tripartite committee to investigate the merits of the case, and
make recommendations. The committee prepares a report for the GB, and the
GB invites the member nation at issue to attend a meeting at which the case is
discussed. Alternatives available to the GB in deciding how to dispense with the
case include (1) adopt the report and refer the case to the regular supervisory
process; (2) publish the report in order to increase the pressure for the nonconforming country to comply; or (3) refer the case to a Commission
of Inquiry, a mechanism that will be described below. Potter, The ILO, at
85-22. The representations procedure has only been invoked on fewer than
100 occasions, but there has recently been a notable increase in the use of this
device. Swepston, International Labour Law, at 164-65.

Report of the Committee Set Up to Examine the
Representation Made by the Senegal Teachers’ Single
and Democratic Trade Union (SUDES) Under Article 24
of the ILO Constitution Alleging Non-observance by
Senegal of the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention
1957 (No. 105) Published: 1997

DECISION

The Governing Body adopted the report of the tripartite committee. Procedure closed.
A. Introduction

1. By letter of 28 August 1995, the Senegal Teachers’ Single and Democratic
Trade Union (SUDES), referring to article 24 of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organization, made a representation alleging the nonobservance by Senegal of the . . . Abolition of Forced Labour Convention,
1957 (No. 105). . . .
B. Examination of the Representation . . .

9. The SUDES alleges failure by the Government of Senegal to observe the
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), by virtue of its
recruitment through a press advertisement of ‘‘1,200 education volunteers.’’
10. As regards the facts, the SUDES alleges that the Government’s press
advertisement . . . specifies that it is aimed at young people who have at least
the equivalent of the BFEM diploma and have ‘‘no short-term employment
prospects.’’ The purpose of this recruitment is among other things to ‘‘reopen
over 500 classes that have been closed because no teacher is available’’ and ‘‘to

97

98

Chapter 2

&

The International Labour Organization and International Labor Standards

halt the decline’’ in the school enrol[l]ment rate, but also ‘‘to combat unemployment and underemployment among young people.’’ The advertisement
explains the Government’s strategy in this area by stating that ‘‘given the constraints facing the State,’’ the Government is seeking to ‘‘launch a movement of
young education volunteers’’ and, for the next four years, ‘‘to recruit 1,200 education volunteers for elementary classes each year, especially for children in
Senegal’s most backward areas.’’ These young people, according to the advertisement, will ‘‘find work which makes good use of their intellectual, moral and
physical potential,’’ will ‘‘learn the profession of teacher,’’ and will ‘‘receive a
monthly scholarship of 50,000 CFA francs and free housing on the spot in
backward areas.’’ . . .
13. As regards observation of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention,
1957 (No. 105), the SUDES emphasizes that, under the terms of Article 1(b) of
the Convention, any Member of the ILO which ratifies the Convention undertakes to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or compulsory
labour ‘‘as a method of mobilizing and using labour for purposes of economic
development.’’ According to the SUDES, this provision has not been observed
by the Government of Senegal which specifies in its ‘‘advertisement’’ for ‘‘education volunteers’’ that it wishes to ‘‘mobilize’’ the potential for commitment of
young people who have ‘‘no short-term employment prospects’’ in a ‘‘movement’’ which would contribute to the development of the country. According
to the SUDES, the population groups targeted by the recruitment drive
(unemployed graduates, young people without employment prospects) clearly
show that economic constraints, the need to find work at all costs are the real
‘‘motivation’’ for these ‘‘volunteers.’’ For them, there is no possibility of choice.
Under such circumstances, using the term ‘‘volunteer’’ is inappropriate, since
those recruited are forced by economic constraints to accept the offer. . . .
II. OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS BY THE GOVERNMENT . . .

17. . . . [T]he Government observes that the country is facing severe economic difficulties at a time when it is required to face up to the challenge of
providing education for all by the year 2000, in accordance with the commitments accepted at Jomtien. Those commitments of 1990, taken as a whole,
confront it and other governments of developing countries with very difficult
choices and necessitate alternative solutions other than tried and tested conventional models. . . .
[The Government responded to SUDES’s charges of political bias in the
selection process by describing at length the system by which candidates were
hired. It also noted that of the 32,595 candidates, 1,200 were selected.]
24. As regards observance of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention,
1957 (No. 105), the Government states that the provisions of the Convention
have not been infringed. There is no question of forced labour, still less of
compulsory labour. The education volunteers are able to await developments.
If they find other employment, they are released at their own request. If, on the
other hand, they decide to pursue a career in teaching, they can continue with
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their training for four years and complete their voluntary work before being
recruited by the public sector or local collectives. . . .
CONCLUSIONS . . .

27. Definition of forced or compulsory labour. The SUDES alleges nonobservance by the Government of Senegal of Article 1(b) of the Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), which has been ratified by Senegal.
Pursuant to that provision, the Government has undertaken not to make use of
any form of forced or compulsory labour as a method of mobilizing and using
labour for purposes of economic development. The Convention does not
define the concept of forced or compulsory labour. According to the established practice of the ILO’s supervisory bodies the definition of the concept of
forced labour contained in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) is generally valid and can thus also be used to determine
what constitutes ‘‘forced or compulsory labour’’ within the meaning of the
1957 Convention, namely ‘‘all work or service which is exacted from any person
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered
himself voluntarily.’’ It was noted during the examination of the draft
1930 Convention by the International Labour Conference that the penalty
in question did not necessarily have to take the form of a penal sanction, but
could also take the form of the loss of any rights or privileges. . . .
28. Economic constraints. The concept of forced or compulsory labour
implies that the worker has not offered himself voluntarily for the work or
service in question. In the case which is the subject of the present representation, the workers concerned responded to a public appeal directed at volunteers
with certain qualifications. Of 32,595 candidates who came forward, 1,200 were
selected. Without contesting the voluntary nature of the offer of service by the
candidates responding to the appeal, the SUDES claims that the candidates
were not free. . . . The Committee notes that the concept of economic constraint was at the heart of the conclusions drawn by ILO bodies concerning
previous representations alleging non-observance of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). It thus appears appropriate to identify the criteria on
which those conclusions were based.
29. Precedents. The Committee set up by the Governing Body to examine
the representation presented in 1983 by the National Trade Union Coordinating Council of Chile (CNS) under article 24 of the Constitution alleging
non-observance by Chile of Convention . . . 29 . . . examined the bearing of
official employment programmes, namely, the ‘‘Minimum Employment
Programme’’ (PEM) and the ‘‘Employment Programme for Heads of
Household’’ (POJH), on the observance of the Forced Labour Convention,
1930 (No. 29). The Committee concluded that persons enrolled in these programmes ‘‘cannot be considered to enjoy freely chosen employment.’’
In particular, the Committee took the view that ‘‘work carried out by many
persons, paid for with excessively low wages and not offering the protection of
the labour and social security legislation, can give rise to doubts concerning its
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voluntary nature, particularly when it involves not a temporary or emergency
solution but a situation that tends to last. . . .
30. Criteria regarding constraint by the Government. If the case submitted
to the Committee for examination has certain similarities with those mentioned above (absence of better alternatives for the candidates, the hope of
finding stable employment), there are a number of important differences that
were taken into account by previous Committees, in particular the level of
remuneration and benefits and the number of persons affected. In a case
where an objective situation of economic constraint exists but has not been
created by the Government, then only if the Government exploits that situation
by offering an excessively low level of remuneration could it to some extent
become answerable for a situation that it did not create. Moreover, it might be
held responsible for organizing or exacerbating economic constraints if the
number of people hired by the Government at excessively low rates of pay
and the quantity of work done by such employees had a knock-on effect on
the situation of other people, causing them to lose their normal jobs and face
identical economic constraints.
31. This has not happened in the present case. Rather than ‘‘a large number
of persons paid at excessively low rates,’’ 1,200 people were selected from more
than 30,000 candidates for the period beginning 1995, and their remuneration,
according to the Government, is above that of student teachers in teacher
training schools having broadly similar functions. . . . In short, the Committee
considers that economic constraints may in practice be such as to be conducive
to forced labour. However, in the present case the Government could not be
held responsible for having created or exacerbated economic constraints, nor
for having exploited them by offering people who had no other options,
employment on terms that would not normally be acceptable.
32. Conclusion. In the light of the above, the Committee concludes that the
representation alleging non-observance by Senegal of the Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) is unfounded.

Notes
1. Why do you think the union brought a representation against the Senegalese government? One major concern, articulated subsequently by
the union in an allegation before a joint ILO/United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) committee, is
the potential for the Education Volunteers Program to undermine the
status and working conditions of the teaching profession. The volunteers initially received a monthly stipend worth just a little over the
Senegalese minimum wage, representing less than half of the monthly
salary of a regular starting teacher. Moreover, the volunteers, who perform work identical to regular teachers, could be required to teach
double-shift classes without additional compensation that would be
due were they employed as regular teachers. Additionally, the collective
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rights and interests of education professionals are implicated by the
program. By decree, the volunteers were prohibited from the right to
freedom of association and to organize into trade unions. SUDES also
complained that the government failed to consult with teachers’ unions
in the development of the program. The government contested this last
point. Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of
the Recommendation Concerning the Status of Teachers — Report,
Part 6, D, 1997.
2. The Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts (CEART), which promotes and monitors UNESCO’s two recommendations on the status
of teachers and of higher education teaching personnel, expressed
concern in 1997 ‘‘that any extensive or permanent use of volunteers
or contract teachers could undermine the status of professional teachers.’’ Id. at Part 7. The committee also noted that volunteers who
work as teachers should have the same associational rights as regular
teachers. Id.
3. Following up on the matter in 2000, CEART noted the following:
The Joint Committee is most concerned with the evidence presented
by both the Government and SUDES that the volunteers policy has
become anchored as a permanent feature in the long-term educational
development programme of Senegal. The suggestion by SUDES that
all prospective teachers will henceforth pass through the voluntary
programme is particularly disturbing. . . . The Joint Committee . . .
again calls on the Government’s attention to paragraph 141 of the
ILO/UNESCO Recommendation, 1966, which emphasizes that measures to deal with teacher shortages should be exceptional and not
endanger teachers’ professional standards.

Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the
Recommendation Concerning the Status of Teachers — Report, Annex
2(2)(D) (2000). Was the initial SUDES representation before the ILO’s
GB premature? Should SUDES have based the representation on a
different ILO convention? Senegal ratified Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize) in 1960 and Convention
No. 98 (Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining) in 1961.
4. For its part, the Senegalese government was in an exceptionally tight
spot. Structural adjustment curbs on hiring public sector employees,
accepted as a condition for international loans, constrain the creation
of a sufficient pool of teachers to meet its goal of universal primary
education. The latter, in conjunction with a lack of public financial
resources, prompted the creation of the volunteers program, which
sought to create a corps of low-paid paraprofessionals. Today, with
some improvements in pay and the creation of a career path to contract
status, and even the possibility of regular civil service employment, socalled volunteers make up a significant percentage of the primary school
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teaching force. Peter Coles, Wanted! Teachers, Education Today Newsletter (UNESCO), Jan.-Mar. 2005, at 4-7.
5. Senegal is not the only developing country facing a severe teacher shortage. To meet the goal of universal primary education (UPE) by 2015,
more than 10.3 million teachers must be recruited worldwide. The
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Senegal, require an additional 1.2 million teachers. Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts
on the Application of the Recommendations Concerning Teaching
Personnel — Report, Tenth Session (2010). For Senegal to meet the
2015 UPE goal, it must increase the present number of teachers by
5.6 percent annually. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Information
Sheet No. 5, The Global Demand for Primary Teachers (2010), at 5.
6. Many developing countries have adopted ‘‘short-term, finance-driven
measures . . . engaging unqualified or poorly qualified teachers on a
short-term contractual basis.’’ Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of
Experts on the Application of the Recommendations Concerning
Teaching Personnel — Report, Ninth Session (2007), at viii. Moreover,
CEART notes that ‘‘[t]he recruitment of . . . unqualified personnel as
teachers, initially adopted as a temporary or emergency measure, has
now become a more persistent and widespread practice.’’ Id. at 12.
7. Senegal, which pioneered the concept of contract teaching through its
volunteer program, now employs about 50 percent of its teachers under
short-term contract. The salaries and working conditions of contract
teachers are significantly below those of civil service teachers. See Alec
Fyfe, The Use of Contract Teachers in Developing Countries: Trends
and Impact (ILO Working Paper, 2007), at vii. The more working
conditions deteriorate for professionals, the greater the impetus to
migrate. Indeed, the International Organization for Migration recently
noted a shift in Senegal from a destination country to one of professional emigration. International Organization for Migration, Migration
au Sénégal: Profil National 2009, available at http://publications.
iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page ¼ product_info&cPath ¼ 41_
42&products_id ¼ 554.

b. Complaints Filed under Article 26
A second adversarial mechanism involves the filing of complaints under
Article 26 of the ILO Constitution. The complaint procedure is reserved for
serious cases of member nation noncompliance with ratified conventions.
Complaints may be filed against a member nation by another member country
that is a party to the treaty at issue. The GB may also initiate the process on its
own motion or after receiving a complaint from any ILC delegate. In some
cases, the GB will establish a Commission of Inquiry to investigate and report
on the case. In others, the case is forwarded to the Committee on Freedom of
Association, which will be described below. In still other cases, the ILO has
settled the matter. Swepston, International Labour Law, at 164.

D. ILO Monitoring and Member Nation Compliance

The complaint process, unlike the process administered by the CEACR, can
result in a legally binding determination that a member state is in breach of its
treaty obligations. Commission of Inquiry findings become binding when the
member country agrees to accept them, or declines to appeal the matter to the
International Court of Justice, which it is permitted to do under Article 29 of
the ILO Constitution, but which no member nation has done to date. HEPPLE,
supra, at 50.

Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed
Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International
Labour Organization to Examine the Observance
by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention
1930 (No. 29) Published: 1998

1. By a letter dated 20 June 1996 addressed to the Director-General of the
ILO, 25 Workers’ delegates to the 83rd Session of the International Labour
Conference (June 1996) presented a complaint under article 26 of the Constitution against the Government of Myanmar for non-observance of the
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), which it ratified on 4 March
1955 and which came into force for Myanmar on 4 March 1956. . . .
PART III . . . SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT AND THE
GOVERNMENT’S OBSERVATIONS

100. In their complaint and supplementary evidence, the complainants
referred to earlier findings by ILO supervisory bodies concerning noncompliance with the forced labour Convention by Myanmar. The complainants alleged that, far from acting to end the practice of forced labour,
the Government of Myanmar was still engaged actively in its promotion, so
that it was today an endemic abuse. . . .
110. Before responding to the complainants’ allegations, the Government
described its initiatives for the emergence of a peaceful, modern and developed
nation, its political, economic and social objectives, and the benefits which the
local population and the nation as a whole draw from the building of infrastructures throughout the country, in particular the building of new railroads,
but also motor roads, irrigation facilities, schools, hospitals, market places,
parks and new towns through the collective efforts of the State, the people
and the members of the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw). . . .
[The Government asserted that all labor utilized as porters by the military,
and for major public and private construction projects, was voluntary and
compensated. It further noted that all relevant national laws had been reviewed
and redrafted.]
120. In conclusion, the Government indicated that the Myanmar authorities were aware of the criticisms made by some Worker delegates relating to the
use of labour in Myanmar for national development projects. A considerable
portion of the criticisms were unfortunately based on biased and specious
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allegations made by expatriates living outside Myanmar who wished to denigrate the Myanmar authorities for their own ends. . . .
PART IV . . . EXAMINATION OF THE CASE BY THE COMMISSION . . .
B. Requirements of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) . . .

205. The basic obligation undertaken by a State which ratifies the Forced
Labour Convention, 1930, is ‘‘to suppress the use of forced or compulsory
labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period.’’ [Article 1(1)] This
obligation to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour, as defined in the
Convention, includes for the State both an obligation to abstain and an obligation to act. In the first place, the State must neither exact forced or compulsory labour nor tolerate its exaction, and it must repeal any laws and statutory
or administrative instruments that provide or allow for the exaction of forced
or compulsory labour, so that any such exaction, be it by private persons or
public servants, is found illegal in national law. Secondly, the State must ensure
that ‘‘the illegal exaction of forced or compulsory labour shall be punishable as
a penal offen[s]e’’ and ‘‘that the penalties imposed by law are really adequate
and are strictly enforced.’’ [Article 25] . . .
206. The Convention defines ‘‘forced or compulsory labour’’ as ‘‘all work or
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for
which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.’’ [Article 2(1)] As noted
by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, it was made clear during the consideration of the draft instrument by
the Conference that the penalty here in question need not be in the form of penal
sanctions, but might take the form also of a loss of rights or privileges. . . .
[The Commission noted that Article 2(2) of the Convention specifically
exempts from the definition of forced or compulsory labor, certain types of
service including: compulsory military service of a purely military character;
normal civic obligations like jury service; some types of prison labor; service
required in emergencies; and minor communal service.]
. . . Legislation of Myanmar relevant to the case . . .
237. After having stated for many years that the provisions of the Village
Act (1908) and the Towns Act (1907) which empower headmen and rural
policemen to impose compulsory labour on residents of the labouring class
had become obsolete and were no longer applied, the Government indicated in
October 1993 that ‘‘the use of voluntary labour, alleged compulsory or forced
labour, is made only for the urgent necessity in accordance with the following
provisions: (a) section 8(1)(g)(n) and (o) of the Village Act (1908); (b) section
9(b) of the Towns Act.’’
238. The relevant provisions of section 8(1) of the Village Act (1908) were
submitted by the Government in October 1993 in the following wording:
Every headman shall be bound to perform the following public duties, namely:
(g) to collect and furnish, upon receipt of payment for the same at such
rates as the Deputy Commissioner may fix, guides, messengers, porters,
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supplies of food, carriage and means of transport for any troops or police
posted in or near or marching through the village-tract or for any servant of
the Government travelling on duty: provided that no headman shall
requisition for personal service any resident of such village-tract who is not
of the labouring class and accustomed to do such work as may be required;
(n) generally to assist all officers of the Government in the execution of
their public duties; and
(o) generally to adopt such measures and do such acts as the exigency of
the village may require.

Section 7(1)(m) of the Towns Act (1907) corresponds to section 8(1)(n) of the
Village Act (1908) and is also preceded by a proviso ‘‘that no headman shall
requisition for personal service any resident of such ward who is not of the
labouring class and accustomed to do such work as may be required.’’
239. Under Section 11 of the Village Act:
Every person residing in the village-tract shall be bound to perform the
following public duties, namely:
( . . . )(d) on the requisition of the headman or of a rural policeman, to
assist him in the execution of his duties prescribed in sections 7 and 8 of the
Act and the rules made under the Act. . . .

Under section 12 of the same Act:
If any person residing in a village-tract refuses or neglects to perform public
duties imposed upon him by this Act or by any rule thereunder, he shall, in the
absence of reasonable excuse, the burden of proving which shall lie upon him,
be liable:
(i) by order of the headman, to fine . . . ; or
(ii) by order of the village committee, on the case being referred to it by the
headman, to fine . . . , or to confinement for a term not exceeding
48 hours in such place as the Deputy Commissioner may appoint in
this behalf, or to both; or
(iii) on conviction by a Magistrate, to fine . . . , or to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding one month, or to both. . . .

[Similar provisions to those above are found in section 9 of the Towns Act
(1907).]
245. . . . [The Government’s] concern about ‘‘causing misery and sufferings
to the local population’’ and the non-remuneration of labour obtained ‘‘from
the local populace in carrying out national development projects, such as
construction of roads, bridges and railways as well as the building of dams and
embankments’’ . . . was expressed in an Order dated 2 June 1995 by the Chairman of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) to State/Division Law and Order Restoration Councils on the subject of ‘‘Prohibiting
unpaid labour contributions in national development projects.’’ While marked
‘‘secret,’’ this Order has according to the Government ‘‘the full legal force
and effect in Administrative Law.’’ The Order makes no reference to the Village
Act or the Towns Act. It notes in paragraph 1 that ‘‘it has been learnt that in
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obtaining labour from the local populace in carrying out national development
projects, such as construction of roads, bridges and railways as well as building
of dams and embankments, the practice is that they have to contribute labour
without compensation.’’ While observing (in paragraph 3) that ‘‘causing misery and sufferings to the people in rural areas due to the so-called forced and
unpaid labour is very much uncalled for,’’ the Order does not put into question
the requisition of labour for national development projects but stresses (in
paragraph 2) that ‘‘it is imperative that in obtaining the necessary labour from
the local people, they must be paid their due share.’’ . . .
258. Under section 374 of the [Myanmar] Penal Code: Whoever unlawfully
compels any person to labour against the will of that person shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
year, or with fine, or with both.
. . . Findings of the Commission concerning the facts . . .
274. Information provided to the Commission indicated that the Myanmar
authorities, including the local and regional administration, the military and
various militias, forced the population of Myanmar to carry out a wide range of
tasks. Labour was exacted from men, women and children, some of a very
young age. Workers were not paid or compensated in any way for providing
their labour, other than in exceptional circumstances, and were commonly
subjected to various forms of verbal and physical abuse including rape, torture
and killing. The vast majority of the information covered the period since 1988,
the year in which the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) came
to power. While the information indicated that the use of forced labour for all
the purposes discussed was prevalent since at least 1988, the use of forced
labour on infrastructure-related work appeared to have been much less
common before 1992. . . .
275. The information provided indicated that Myanmar’s military and
various militias made systematic and widespread use of civilians to provide
logistical support. This most commonly involved the use of porters to carry a
range of supplies and equipment. In comparison to other forms of compulsory
labour, the treatment of porters, especially during military offensives, was
particularly brutal; such porters were also likely to be exposed to danger in
combat situations.
276. In addition to providing porters for the military, villagers across the
country, and to a lesser extent urban residents, were required to construct and
repair military camps and provide general workers for these facilities on a
permanent basis. A number of villagers had to be on permanent stand-by at
camps to act as messengers. Villagers also had to provide the necessary materials for the construction and repair of these facilities. . . .
277. The information also disclosed a variety of other tasks that people
throughout Myanmar were requisitioned to carry out in support of the
military, such as acting as guides, sentries and minesweepers. It appeared
that such people were also used as human shields, in that they would be
sent ahead of troops to draw enemy fire, trip booby-traps, or as hostages to
prevent attacks against columns or army camps. . . .
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278. The question of forced recruitment into the Tatmadaw and various
militia forces was also brought to the attention of the Commission. In some
cases recruits appeared to be arbitrarily requisitioned, without any reference to
compulsory military service legislation, and included minors. . . .
280. The information revealed that over the last ten years the Government
of Myanmar had implemented a large number of national and local infrastructure projects, in particular the construction and improvement of various roads
and railways and associated infrastructure such as bridges. These projects
appeared to be constructed in large part with the use of forced labour,
sometimes involving hundreds of thousands of workers.
281. Similarly, it appeared that forced labour was used by the Government
in relation to a range of other infrastructure projects and public works such as
dams, irrigation works and airports.
282. Urban residents in particular were required to work, usually one day
per week, on the cleaning and maintenance of urban areas. This was organized
by the ward authorities, but was often supervised by the military. . . .
284. It appeared that persons exacting forced labour in Myanmar were not
subject to legal sanction, and were therefore enjoying full impunity. Several
witnesses who had undertaken general research and investigation informed the
Commission that there had been, to their knowledge, no cases of persons being
punished for forcing others to provide their labour, or for committing abuses
against those so forced.
285. The numbers of people in Myanmar affected by forced labour
appeared to be vast. In 1995, Human Rights Watch/Asia estimated that
since 1992 at least two million people had been forced to work without pay
on the construction of roads, railways and bridges. . . .
292. The information before the Commission was that the penalties for
failing to comply with forced labour demands were harsh. Punishments
included detention at the army camp, often in leg-stocks or in a pit in the
ground, commonly accompanied by beatings and other forms of torture, as
well as deprivation of food, water, medical attention and other basic rights.
Women were subject to rape and other forms of sexual abuse at such times. . . .
. . . National laws and statutory or administrative standard-setting instruments, considered in the light of the Convention
470. The Commission notes that section 11(d), read together with section
8(1)(g), (n) and (o) of the Village Act, as well as section 9(b) of the Towns Act
provide for the exaction of work or services from any person residing in a village
tract or in a town ward, that is, work or services for which the said person has not
offered himself or herself voluntarily, and that failure to comply with a requisition
made under section 11(d) of the Village Act or section 9(b) of the Towns Act is
punishable with penal sanctions under section 12 of the Village Act or section
9A of the Towns Act. Thus, these Acts provide for the exaction of ‘‘forced or
compulsory labour’’ within the definition of Article 2(1) of the Convention. . . .
471. The Commission notes that the provisions of the Village Act and the
Towns Act under which residents may be required to perform forced or compulsory labour on a general or individual requisition of the headman are
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‘‘widely worded,’’ as was also noted in Executive Orders made under the Village
Act; indeed, residents are to assist the headman in the execution of his public
duties, which in turn include the duty to supply guides, messengers, porters,
etc., to any troops or police posted near or marching through a village tract and
generally to assist all officers of the Government in the execution of their public
duties. Thus, the labour and services that may be exacted under the Village Act
and the Towns Act are as indefinite as the needs of the Government; they are
limited neither to emergencies nor to minor communal services as defined in
Article 2, paragraph 2(d) and (e), of the Convention, and more generally do not
come under any of the exceptions listed in Article 2, paragraph 2. . . .
473. Section 8(1)(g) of the Village Act provides for payments to headmen
for the collection and supply of guides, messengers, porters, etc., but nowhere
in the Village Act or Towns Act is provision made for any payment to residents
called up for labour or services. The (secret) order dated 2 June 1995 on
‘‘Prohibiting unpaid labour contributions in national development projects’’
stresses that ‘‘in obtaining the necessary labour from the local people, they must
be paid their full share.’’ . . . [T]he mere payment of wages for labour obtained
through the call-up of local residents does not remove such labour from the
scope of the definition of forced or compulsory labour in Article 2(1) of the
Convention. Payment does not change the character of labour exacted compulsorily or by force; it merely becomes paid compulsory or forced labour. . . .
475. More importantly, evidence before the Commission on actual
practice, . . . shows the continued call-up of local people for labour and services
(without any compensation). . . .
478. Section 374 of the Penal Code . . . complies with the first requirement
of Article 25 of the Convention, namely that ‘‘The illegal exaction of forced or
compulsory labour shall be punishable as a penal offence.’’ Whether the penalties under section 374, which may range from a fine to imprisonment of up to
one year or both, do comply with the second requirement of Article 25 of the
Convention, namely that they ‘‘are really adequate,’’ could only be appreciated
if they were ‘‘strictly enforced,’’ as Article 25 of the Convention furthermore
requires. In the absence of any indication that section 374 of the Penal Code
was ever applied, the Commission is bound to point out that penalties under
that provision, as well as under Article 25 of the Convention, are to be imposed
for the exaction of forced or compulsory labour that is found illegal. Thus, only
a requisition of labour and services that is not covered by the very wide provisions of the Village Act or the Towns Act could, in theory, be punished at the
present stage under section 374 of the Penal Code, while forced labour imposed
in violation of the Convention but in conformity with the Village Act or the
Towns Act might not be punishable at the national level. . . .
PART V . . . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . .

536. In conclusion, the obligation under Article 1, paragraph 1, of the
Convention to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour is violated
in Myanmar in national law, in particular by the Village Act and the Towns
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Act, as well as in actual practice in a widespread and systematic manner, with
total disregard for the human dignity, safety and health and basic needs of the
people of Myanmar.
537. Concurrently, the Government violates its obligation under Article 25 of
the Convention to ensure that the penalties imposed by law for the illegal exaction of forced or compulsory labour are both really adequate and strictly
enforced. While section 374 of the Penal Code provides for the punishment of
those unlawfully compelling any person to labour against the will of that person,
that provision does not appear to be ever applied in practice, even where the
methods used for rounding up people do not follow the provisions of the Village
Act or the Towns Act, which are in any event never referred to in practice. . . .
539. In view of the Government’s flagrant and persistent failure to comply
with the Convention, the Commission urges the Government to take the
necessary steps to ensure:
(a) that the relevant legislative texts, in particular the Village Act and the
Towns Act, be brought into line with the Forced Labour Convention,
1930 (No. 29) as already requested by the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations and promised by
the Government for over 30 years, and again announced in the Government’s observations on the complaint. This should be done without
further delay and completed at the very latest by 1 May 1999;
(b) that in actual practice, no more forced or compulsory labour be
imposed by the authorities, in particular the military. . . .
(c) that the penalties which may be imposed under section 374 of the Penal
Code for the exaction of forced or compulsory labour be strictly
enforced, in conformity with Article 25 of the Convention. This
requires thorough investigation, prosecution and adequate punishment of those found guilty. . . .
540. The recommendations made by the Commission require action to be
taken by the Government of Myanmar without delay. The task of the Commission of Inquiry is completed by the signature of its report, but it is desirable that
the International Labour Organization should be kept informed of the progress
made in giving effect to the recommendations of the Commission. The
Commission therefore recommends that the Government of Myanmar should
indicate regularly in its reports under article 22 of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organization concerning the measures taken by it to
give effect to the provisions of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930
(No. 29), the action taken during the period under review to give effect to
the recommendations contained in the present report. . . .

Notes
1. The establishment of a Commission of Inquiry is a rare event reserved
for cases involving the most serious, persistent violations of the ILO’s
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conventions. Indeed, since 1919, the GB has appointed less than a
dozen Commissions of Inquiry. Commissions, which consist of
three eminent jurists or scholars, play both investigatory and adjudicatory roles. To those ends, they establish their own procedures, take
testimony, request and review documentation, and, if permitted by
the country in question, may make site visits to ascertain conditions
first hand. Swepston, International Labour Law, at 164. The report
prepared by a Commission of Inquiry is a manifestation of its adjudicatory function, stating the factual findings, legal conclusions, and
recommendations in the case. The member country in question is
given three months to either accept the report or indicate that it
will appeal to the International Court of Justice, the latter which, as
noted above, is a step that has never been taken by any country. Potter,
The ILO, at 85-23.
2. A country that refuses to carry out the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry is subject to Article 33 of the ILO Constitution,
which provides:
In the event of any Member failing to carry out within the time
specified the recommendations, if any, contained in the report of
the Commission of Inquiry, or in the decision of the International
Court of Justice, as the case may be, the Governing Body may recommend to the [International Labor] Conference such action as it
may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith.

ILO Constitution, Article 33. This constitutional provision lay dormant until the Myanmar case.
3. In June 1999, almost one year after the Commission of Inquiry in the
Myanmar case issued its recommendations, the ILC passed a resolution that condemned the state’s refusal to institute the Commission’s
recommendations; prohibited any ILO technical assistance other
than that necessary to implement the recommendations; and banned
Myanmar from attending most ILO meetings. Potter, The ILO, at 8524. The following year, in June 2000, the ILC adopted a resolution
proposed by the GB invoking Article 33. Among other things, the
resolution asked ILO members and international organizations to
review and take appropriate measures regarding their relationships
with Myanmar to avoid abetting the practice of forced labor. HEPPLE,
supra, at 51. Encompassed within such a re-examination was the possibility that trade sanctions might be imposed upon Myanmar by the
member states. Potter, The ILO, at 85-25.
4. Since then, the Myanmar government has agreed to the appointment
of an ILO liaison officer in Myanmar, and allowed an ILO very High
Level Team to travel to the country to assess the progress being made
to eliminate the use of forced labor. A 2005 CCAS report on Myanmar,
however, noted that the extent of the use of forced labor in most areas
of Myanmar had not been significantly reduced. Moreover, neither the
Village Act nor the Towns Act, which authorize the use of forced labor,
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5.

6.

7.

8.

had been repealed. The ILO liaison officer had not been permitted to
travel freely throughout the country, and the very High Level Team
was not met by high-level government officials, and cut short its
mission. The CCAS noted that it was particularly alarmed at the government’s stated intention to prosecute those accused of falsely
lodging complaints of forced labor, and also at the apparent intimidation of complainants seeking contact with the ILO liaison officer.
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, Special
Sitting to Examine Developments Concerning the Question of the
Observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour
Convention, 1930 (No. 29) (2005).
In June 2008, as it has every year since 2001, the ILO’s Conference
Committee on the Application of Standards held a special sitting
concerning Myanmar’s application of Convention No. 29. Two significant series of events — one political and the other natural —
formed the backdrop for the discussion. The first involved the significant public demonstrations against the government in September
2007, which were prompted by the government’s increase of fuel
prices. These mass demonstrations, led at first by dissidents and
then mainly by Buddhist monks, were ruthlessly suppressed by the
government. Seth Mydans, Myanmar Monks Protests Contained by
Junta’s Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at A1.
As for the natural occurrence, in May 2008, shortly before the
International Labour Conference, Myanmar was hit by Cyclone Nargis, which devastated the country’s Irrawaddy and Yangon Divisions.
An estimated 130,000 people died as a result of the storm. A slow
response by the government, and its initial unwillingness to let foreign
aid workers enter affected areas, compounded the tragedy. Burmese
Endure in Spite of Junta, Aid Workers Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008.
Discussion at the June 2008 special sitting highlighted an interesting
development: The Myanmar government, represented at the sitting,
reported that a new State Constitution had been approved by national
referendum in May 2008. Apparently over 26.8 million people voted in
favor of adopting the Constitution, representing 92.48 percent of the
vote. The Constitution contains a provision relating to forced labor,
stated the government representative. See Conference Committee on
the Application of Standards: Extracts from the Record of Proceedings,
Part III, Ninety-Seventh Session, Geneva, 2008, Convention 29, Forced
Labour Convention, 1930 Myanmar (ratification: 1955), at 3 (hereinafter Conference Committee Special Sitting).
Worker members at the 2008 special sitting noted that the new Constitution’s prohibition of forced labor was unclear and contained so
many caveats and restrictions that it contradicts Convention No. 29.
See id. at 4. Nevertheless, there is evidence of very slow progress in
amending legislation at odds with Convention No. 29. At its March
2011 session, the ILO Governing Body ‘‘note[d] the [Myanmar]
Government’s indication that draft legislation aimed at achieving
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legislative conformity with Convention No. 29 is in the process of
preparation.’’ The GB invited the Government of Myanmar to avail
itself of ILO technical assistance ‘‘with a view to the rapid amendment
of the Village and Towns Acts. . . .’’ Governing Body, Decision on the
Fifth Item on the Agenda: Developments Concerning the Question of
the Observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Mar. 24, 2011 (hereinafter, Governing
Body, Decision on the Fifth Item (Forced Labour)).
9. A February 2007 Supplementary Understanding between the ILO and
the Myanmar government established a complaint mechanism for
forced labor victims that allows them to lodge complaints directly
with the ILO liaison officer, who then communicates with the government’s Working Group. The Myanmar government representative at
the June 2008 special sitting reported progress on the implementation
of the Supplementary Understanding. A translation of the Supplementary Understanding into the Myanmar language was completed and
posted on the Ministry of Labor’s website, noted the government
representative. Additionally, the government had taken steps to publicize the Supplementary Understanding through a March 2007 press
conference. See Conference Committee Special Sitting at 3. In March
2011, the Governing Body welcomed the extension of the Supplementary Understanding for another year, and noted an increase in the
number of cases filed under it. Governing Body, Decision on the Fifth
Item (Forced Labour).
10. The Myanmar government’s ruthless suppression of freedom of association has long been an ILO concern. The new Constitution, however,
contains specific articles on freedom of association, freedom of expression, and the right to organize. An English translation of the Constitution is available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/7694880/MyanmarConstitution-2008-English-version. Chapter VII, Section 354 provides
in pertinent part:
Every citizen shall be at liberty in the exercise of the following rights,
if not contrary to the laws, enacted for Union security, prevalence of
law and order, community peace and tranquility or public order and
morality:
(a) to express and publish freely their convictions and opinions;
(b) to assemble peacefully without arms and holding procession;
(c) to form associations and organizations. . . .

Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008,
Chapter VII, Section 354. The right to organize trade unions is not
expressly provided for.
11. At the June 2010 International Labour Conference, several worker
delegates filed an Article 26 complaint against Myanmar for violation
of Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association). At its March
2011 meeting, the Governing Body, having examined the Myanmar
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government’s response to the complaint, deferred its decision on
appointing a Commission of Inquiry until its November 2011 session.
The GB also requested the Myanmar government produce for review
that government’s supposed ‘‘draft law on Labour Organizations.’’
Governing Body, Decision on the Sixth Item on the Agenda: Complaint Concerning the Observance by Myanmar of the Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention,
1948 (No. 87), Made by Delegates to the 99th Session (June 2010)
of the International Labour Conference Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the ILO, Mar. 24, 2011.
12. As noted above, the Myanmar government’s treatment of freedom of
association is infamous. Illustrative of its methods was a general election, aimed at the supposed continued democratization of the country,
which was held November 7, 2010, while opposition leader and Nobel
Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi was still under house arrest. She
was released on November 13, 2010. In March 2011, the GB called for
the release from detention of a number of specific individuals, including labor activists and ‘‘persons associated with the making of, or
supporting the submission of, complaints under the Supplementary
Understanding.’’ Governing Body, Decision on the Fifth Item (Forced
Labour). Notably, in October 2011, Myanmar released an estimated
120 political prisoners, ‘‘a small fraction of the 2,000 or so . . . that
Amnesty International estimates to be behind bars.’’ Seth Mydans,
Myanmar Begins to Release Some of Its Political Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2011. Many commentators see the prisoners’ release, and
other recent steps, as evidence of systemic change by one of the world’s
most closed and inflexible governments. Id.
13. The ILO’s procedures for enforcing international labor standards are
directed at member states rather than at private employers. Yet private
employers may directly or indirectly bear responsibility for abysmal
working conditions. In the Myanmar case, for example, there was
evidence in the form of secondary statements that forced labor was
used for helipad construction and ground clearance work for the
Yadana gas pipeline project, a joint venture of French oil company
Total, American-owned oil giant Unocal, and the Myanmar Oil and
Gas Enterprise, a state-owned company established by the Myanmar
military. The Commission of Inquiry, which had requested and been
denied access to the country by the Myanmar government, could make
no finding on the matter. Report of the Commission of Inquiry
Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International
Labour Organization to Examine the Observance by Myanmar of the
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), at ô 452.
14. Human rights activists found another device for addressing the alleged
atrocities committed in connection with the Yadana gas pipeline project. In the fall of 1996, two suits were filed in U.S. federal court
by Myanmar villagers who suffered abuses at the hands of the Myanmar military related to the project. The suits were brought against

113

114

Chapter 2

&

The International Labour Organization and International Labor Standards

Myanmar, Total, and Unocal, and based largely on the U.S. Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, a controversial 200-year-old
statute that lay dormant until 1980. The ATCA confers upon the U.S.
federal district courts ‘‘original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.’’ Id.
Ultimately, the claims against the Myanmar military and Myanmar Oil
were dismissed because those entities were entitled to sovereign immunity. The claims against Total were dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir.
2002). The case against Unocal, however, wound its way through
federal and California state court, and was ultimately settled in March
2005. Although the settlement amount is confidential, the parties
announced that the money will be used to compensate and protect
the villagers, and develop programs in the pipeline region to improve
health care, living conditions, and education. Marc Lifsher, Unocal
Settles Human Rights Lawsuit over Alleged Abuses at Myanmar Pipeline,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005. Chapter 14 includes an excerpt of the Unocal
case and discusses in greater detail use of the Alien Tort Claims Act as a
mechanism for enforcing international labor rights in U.S. courts.

c. The Committee on Freedom of Association
A special body was created by the ILO in 1950 to examine complaints brought by
governments, workers’ organizations, or employers’ organizations that an ILO
member nation’s law or practice violates principles of freedom of association
(CFA). The CFA is a tripartite body composed of nine members of the GB,
and presided over by an independent chair. It draws its authority from the ILO
Constitution, along with the Declaration of Philadelphia, both of which embody,
inter alia, freedom of association as a fundamental principle that all ILO members
agree to observe. Thus, ratification of the freedom of association conventions,
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98, is not a prerequisite to bringing a complaint against a
member country before the CFA. Swepston, International Labour Law, at 165.
The CFA generally decides cases on the basis of documentary evidence. It
usually reaches decisions by consensus. HEPPLE, supra, at 52. The CFA meets three
times annually, and has reviewed over 3,000 cases. Potter, The ILO, at 85-28.

Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against
the Government of Canada Concerning the Province of
Ontario Presented by the Ontario Federation of Labour
(OFL) and the Canada Labour Congress (CLC)
Case No. 2182, Report No. 330 (2003)

INTRODUCTION

Allegations: The complainants allege that some provisions of the Ontario
Labour Relations Act encourage the decertification of workers’ organizations
by requiring employers to post and distribute in the workplace documents
setting out the process to terminate trade union bargaining rights. . . .
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308. Canada has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87). It has not ratified the Right to
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), the Labour
Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151), nor the Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154).
BACKGROUND
A. The Complainants’ Allegations

309. The Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL), affiliated to the Canadian
Labour Congress, is made up of 650,000 workers in more than 1,500 affiliated
local unions. This complaint concerns some provisions of the Labour Relations
Amendment Act, 2000 (Bill No. 139) which, according to the OFL, infringe
guarantees of freedom of association and, in particular, ILO Conventions Nos.
87, 98 and 151. These provisions encourage the decertification of workers’
organizations by requiring employers to post and distribute in the workplace
documents prepared by the Minister of Labour, setting out the process to
terminate trade union bargaining rights.
310. Bill No. 139 passed third reading and received royal assent in
December 2000. These provisions are now contained in section 63.1 of the
Labour Relations Act (the LRA), which provides:
63.1(1) Within one year after the day the Labour Relations Amendment
Act, 2000, receives royal assent, the Minister shall cause to be prepared and
published a document describing the process for making an application for a
declaration that the trade union no longer represents the employees in a
bargaining unit. . . .
63.1(3) The document shall explain who may make an application, when
an application may be made and the procedure, as set out in this Act and in
any rules made by the chair of the Board . . . that the Board follows in dealing
with an application.
63.1(4) An employer with respect to whom a trade union has been certified as a bargaining agent . . . shall use reasonable efforts:
(a) to post and keep posted a copy of a document published under
this section in a conspicuous place in every workplace of the employer at
which employees represented by the trade union perform work;
(b) to post and keep posted with that copy a notice that any
employee represented by the trade union may request a copy of the
document from the employer;
(c) once in each calendar year, to provide a copy of the document
to all employees of the employer who are represented by the trade union;
and
(d) upon the request of an employee . . . to provide a copy of the
document to him or her, even though the employer has previously
provided or will subsequently provide the employee with a copy of
the document.
63.1(5) An employer shall not be found to be in violation of this Act as a
result of doing anything set out in subsection (4).
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311. In accordance with these provisions, the Minister of Labour prepared
and published a document describing the process for decertification in December
2001. A copy of the poster and brochure were mailed that same month to
all employers who had registered a collective bargaining relationship with the
Ministry of Labour.
312. The complainants allege that section 63.1 of the LRA contravenes
Convention No. 87, ratified by Canada, and is entirely inconsistent with the
Government’s obligations under international law to encourage, promote and
protect the right of employees to bargain collectively. This provision constitutes a powerful message by the State of its opposition to the unionization of
employees and a clear interference with that right. By virtue of freedom of
association principles, all workers have the right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing; governments must take measures to encourage
and promote the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary
negotiation between unions and employers, and must allow trade unions to
operate in full freedom.
313. The complainants submit that this provision constitutes a significant
interference with the rights of employees to join and participate in the activities
of trade unions. Rather than meeting its obligations at international law to
encourage the process of collective bargaining, the Government of Ontario
clearly intends to weaken trade unions and to encourage individuals not to
exercise their right to organize or to engage in collective bargaining. Rather
than encouraging the exercise of the right to collective bargaining the Government has chosen in a discriminatory and one-sided manner to promote the
decertification of existing trade unions by conducting a campaign which can
only be seen as designed to encourage interference with the exercise of trade
union freedoms. . . .
315. The legislation in question is noteworthy in that it advises employees
only of their rights to decertify under the Labour Relations Act. It does not
mention any of the rights that are intended to protect freedom of association
including the right to engage in certification and in lawful activities of trade
unions and to be free from discrimination or anti-union reprisal, all matters
which are covered by the LRA. . . .
316. In addition, the Government has not chosen to require that similar
posters or brochures be distributed in non-union workplaces advising employees of their rights to unionize, thus making it plain that the intention of the
legislative provisions is not to inform employees about relevant labour relations laws in an even-handed fashion but is rather to interfere with the right of
employees who have chosen to unionize. . . .
B. The Government’s Reply

318. In its communication of 3 October 2002, the Government of Ontario
submits that the obligation made to employers in unionized workplaces to post
a decertification information poster under Bill No. 139 does not violate ILO
Conventions Nos. 87, 98, 151 and 154.
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319. The Labour Relations Amendment Act, 2000 (Bill No. 139), which
received royal assent on 21 December 2000, among other things, amended the
Labour Relations Act, 1995 (LRA) to require within one year the publication of
a document describing the process for making an application for a declaration
that a trade union no longer represents the employees in a bargaining unit. . . .
320. The document sets out neutral factual information about union decertification. It explains who may make an application, when an application may
be made and the procedure as set out in the Act and in the rules of the Ontario
Labour Relations Board (OLRB). Every unionized employer is required to use
reasonable efforts to post a copy of the document in the workplace, provide a
copy of the document to every unionized employee once per calendar year and
provide a copy to unionized employees who request it. Compliance with these
reasonable efforts requirements by an employer will not constitute an unfair
labour practice under the Act.
321. Generally, the statutory reasonable efforts to post and distribute apply
to employers with a collective bargaining relationship governed by the LRA.
These requirements do not apply to employers who have no unionized employees or employers whose unionized employees are governed under other statutes, for example, firefighters covered by the Fire Protection and Prevention
Act, 1997; police and related employees covered by the Police Services Act or
the Public Service Act; employees of a college covered by the Colleges Collective
Bargaining Act; or teachers covered by the Education Act and the Provincial
Schools Negotiations Act. . . .
323. The Government of Ontario submits that these provisions support
workplace democracy and the individual right of workers freely to decide
whether they wish to be represented by a union and continue with union
representation. Certification information is made available to employees by
unions during an organization drive but, until now, there had been little information available to employees about decertification. Unions did not provide it
and employers were generally prohibited from doing so. The purpose of the
decertification poster is simply to inform employees of their rights under the
LRA, which they may otherwise not be aware of, by providing neutral, factual
information. . . .
CONCLUSIONS
C. The Committee’s Conclusions

328. The Committee notes that this case concerns section 63.1 of the
Labour Relations Act of Ontario (the ‘‘LRA’’) which provides that employers
in unionized settings must post and circulate information, prepared by the
Ministry of Labour, on rules and procedures for trade union decertification. . . .
329. The Committee recalls that measures should be taken to guarantee
freedom of association, which includes the effective recognition of collective
bargaining. This necessarily implies the taking of positive steps, conducive to
achieving freedom of association and the collective regulation of employment
terms and conditions.
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330. The Committee considers that the provisions challenged in the present
case cannot promote and encourage freedom of association. Quite the
contrary, the poster and accompanying notice, being information prepared
by the Ministry of Labour and posted in unionized workplaces with the Ministry’s formal endorsement may be considered, at best, as a message by the
Government that a decertification application would be entertained favourably
and, at worst, as an incitement to apply for decertification, thus contravening
Convention No. 87 ratified by Canada.
331. The Government’s argument that the object of this provision is to
provide neutral and factual information might have been more convincing had
the amending legislation introduced parallel provisions, with the official
endorsement of the Labour Ministry, to inform workers in all non-unionized
workplaces . . . of their right to organize and the procedures to do so, and of the
various existing legal guarantees to ensure the free exercise of that right, e.g.
protection against trade union discrimination (before and during certification), protection against employer interference, etc. . . .
333. The Committee considers that section 63.1 of the LRA does not
encourage the promotion of freedom of association, is not conducive to
harmonious labour relations and may rather ultimately prove counterproductive by creating a recurring climate of confrontation over certification
issues. The Committee considers that it would be actually advantageous
for the Government to avoid this type of provision and therefore requests
it to repeal section 63.1 of the LRA and to keep it informed of developments
in this respect.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Committee’s Recommendation

334. In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the
Governing Body to approve the following recommendation:
The Committee requests the Government of Ontario to repeal section
63.1 of the Labour Relations Act and to keep it informed of developments
in this respect.

Notes
1. What message do the posters required under the Ontario Labour Relations Act send to unionized employees? What was the provincial government trying to achieve by requiring decertification information to be
posted in unionized workplaces? Why do you think the CFA complaint
was brought in this case? As noted in Chapter 4, Canada has the dubious
distinction of leading the G-7 countries in the number of freedom
of association complaints filed against it. Between 1954 and 2005,
91 complaints on that subject were filed against Canada with the
ILO. See Chapter 4, section A (Introduction).
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2. The government in its reply stated that it was intent upon safeguarding
the individual worker’s right to choose to be part of a union or not. This
emphasis on individual choice rather than collective workplace voice is
not unique to Canadian law. Indeed, it can be found in aspects of
British, American, Australian, and New Zealander law as well. Focusing
on U.S. labor policy, Professor Roy Adams argues that in order to meet
international human rights standards, a nation’s laws must do more
than guarantee an employee’s choice to engage in collective bargaining.
Rather, ‘‘states must ensure that all employees have in place an
independent collective voice through which their employment interests
may be represented.’’ Roy J. Adams, Choice or Voice? Rethinking
American Labor Policy in Light of the International Human Rights Consensus, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 521, 522 (2001). Similarly, Lord
Wedderburn took to task British labor law for an ‘‘obsession with individualism,’’ evidenced by the dominance of individual employment
contracts over collective bargaining agreements. Lord Wedderburn,
Common Law, Labour Law, Global Law, in SOCIAL AND LABOUR RIGHTS
IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 19, 35-37 (Bob Hepple ed., 2002). For information
on the Australian and New Zealander approaches, see Sean Cooney,
A Broader Role for the Commonwealth in Eradicating Foreign Sweatshops?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 290, 339 (2004); Ellen J. Dannin, Consummating Market-Based Labor Law Reform in New Zealand: Context and
Reconfiguration, 14 B.U. INT’L L.J. 267 (1996).
3. The CFA notes that it is incumbent upon the government to ‘‘tak[e] . . .
positive steps, conducive to achieving freedom of association and the
collective regulation of employment terms and conditions.’’ Committee
on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against the Government of
Canada Concerning the Province of Ontario Presented by the Ontario
Federation of Labour (OFL) and the Canada Labour Congress (CLC),
Case No. 2182, Report No. 330, at ô 329. Does this imply that public
policy must favor unionization? Article 2 of Convention No. 87 states
that ‘‘[w]orkers . . . shall have the right to establish and . . . join organisations of their own choosing. . . .’’ Article 8(2) provides that ‘‘[t]he law
of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to
impair, the guarantees provided for in this Convention.’’ Article 11
constitutes a pledge by ratifying members ‘‘to take all necessary and
appropriate measures to ensure that workers . . . may exercise freely
their right to organise.’’ Can these three provisions be read as imposing
an affirmative duty to promote collective bargaining?
4. Bill 144, An Act to Amend Certain Statutes Relating to Labor Relations,
received royal assent and came into force in Ontario, Canada on June
13, 2005. Sections 4 and 5 of the bill repeal subsections 63 and 63.1 of the
Ontario Labour Relations Act, which formerly required the preparation
and posting in unionized workplaces of documents on the procedures
for obtaining union decertification. Bill 144, 1st Session, 38th Legislature, Ontario, 54 Elizabeth II, 2005. Does the Ontario Legislature’s

119

120

Chapter 2

&

The International Labour Organization and International Labor Standards

repeal of a provision found by the CFA to contravene Convention
No. 87 constitute evidence that the ILO machinery was effective in
this case? Bill 144 was introduced by Ontario’s reigning Liberal Party,
which came to power in 2003 promising to restore fairness and balance to
labor relations, a balance it maintained had been upset by the actions of
the pro-labor New Democratic Party and pro-business Progressive Conservative Party during the 1990s. Murray Campbell, A New Minister, a
Dysfunctional Work Force, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 4, 2004, at A11.
5. On January 30, 2009, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order
13496, which requires most federal departments and agencies ‘‘to
include within their Government contracts specific provisions requiring
contractors and subcontractors . . . to post notices informing their
employees of their rights as employees under Federal labor laws,’’
including the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which protects
worker freedom of association and self-organization. See Notification
of Employee Rights Under Federal Labor Laws, 75 Fed. Reg. 28,368 (May
20, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 471). The National Labor
Relations Board subsequently proposed a rule requiring all employers
subject to the agency’s jurisdiction to post notices using the language
adopted by the Department of Labor pursuant to the executive order.
The executive order only affects federal government contractors and
subcontractors, making the Board’s proposal a significant extension
of notice requirements. Lawrence E. Dubé, NLRB Proposed Rule
Requires Notice Posting by All Employers Under Board’s Jurisdiction,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at AA-1 (Dec. 21, 2010). The Board received
close to 6,500 public comments on the proposed rule by the close of the
60-day comment period, including those from business interests who
consider the agency to be biased in favor of unions. Lawrence E. Dubé,
NLRB Notice Proposal Draws Heavy Comment, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA),
at AA-1 (Feb. 24, 2011). Despite business opposition, the Board issued a
final notice posting rule in August 2011, which is effective as of January
31, 2012. The new notice required by non-federal contractors is similar
to the one required by the executive order. Will notifying employees of
their right to associate and organize affect organizing rates or union
density?
6. The required poster that government contractors and subcontractors
must display informs employees that they have the right to organize a
union for the purpose of negotiation; form, join, or assist a union; bargain
collectively; discuss workplace terms and conditions of employment with
their co-workers; take action with one or more co-workers to improve
working conditions; strike and picket, depending on the purpose; or
refrain from these activities. It also lists illegal employer and union
actions. Does the poster promote collective bargaining and unionization,
as its critics charge? The poster can be accessed at http://www.dol.gov/
olms/regs/compliance/EmployeeRightsPoster11x17_Final.pdf.

